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Abstract 
In the current paper, we study the asymmetric normal-form game between two heterogeneous groups of  populations by 
employing the stochastic replicator dynamics driven by Lévy process. A new game equilibrium, i.e., the game 
equilibrium of  a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, is derived by introducing optimal-stopping technique 
into evolutionary game theory, which combines with the Pareto optimal standard leads us to the existence of  Pareto 
optimal endogenous matching. Moreover, stability of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching is confirmed by 
essentially using the well-known Girsanov Theorem. 
Keywords: Stochastic differential cooperative game on time; Endogenous matching; 
Stability; Fairness; Adaptive learning. 
JEL classification: C62; C70; C78. 
1. Introduction 
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It is convincing to argue that people live in a highly structured society consists of  groups rather than 
individuals, which implies that random matching will not always provide us with compelling 
approximation to reality when we are concerned with the interactions among the players. In fact, 
Ellison (1993) shows that local interaction will have very important and also different implications in 
equilibrium selection relative to that of  uniform interaction or random matching. So, given the 
importance of  non-random matching in equilibrium selection, we express the motivation of  the 
present paper as follows, i.e., can we directly prove the existence and stability of  certain non-random 
matching that is Pareto optimal and also endogenously determined in a given game situation? If  we 
can, what are the conditions we will rely on? In other words, the major goal of  the present 
exploration is not to study any exogenously given matching mechanism but to find out the optimal 
matching mechanism in a given game situation, and to prove its stability.1 
In two pioneering papers, Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993) prove that the trial-and-error 
learning processes of  the players will definitely converge to one particular pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, which is named as the long run equilibrium by Kandori et al. and the convention by Young. 
From the perspective of  multiple-equilibrium problem, they provide us with an equilibrium selection 
device, under which the players are correctly predicted to play a particular Nash equilibrium. 
However, we can also evaluate their contribution from the following view of  point, i.e., provided a 
particular Nash equilibrium, they prove that there exists a pattern of  learning mechanism that will 
definitely lead the players to play the given Nash equilibrium. To summarize, they confirm the 
existence of  certain type of  learning mechanism, based upon which the players’ behavior will be 
uniquely predicted in the long run. Instead of  emphasizing micro-strategy, we focus on macro-structure 
and it is confirmed that there exist certain macro-structure under which one particular Pareto 
optimal Nash equilibrium will be definitely played by the players. Obviously, in order to derive much 
more comprehensive understanding of  the strategic behaviors of  the individuals in a given society, 
micro-strategy and macro-structure should be explored as a whole. Accordingly, the present study 
also examines the internal relationship between the micro-strategy and the macro-structure by 
analyzing the internal relationship between the learning mechanism and the matching mechanism. 
That is to say, the Pareto optimal endogenous matching as well as the Pareto-optimal Nash 
equilibrium can be regarded as the limit of  the learning processes of  the players in some sense by 
noting that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the Pareto optimal endogenous 
matching and the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, if  we argue that different matching 
mechanisms imply different Nash equilibria, we have demonstrated that there exists certain learning 
mechanism under which one particular matching mechanism will be achieved, that is, one particular 
micro-strategy implies one particular macro-structure under certain relatively weak conditions. To 
conclude, we indeed prove the following two important and also interesting claims: first, provided a 
particular Nash equilibrium, we show the existence of  one matching mechanism such that the given 
                                                        
1 That is to say, in an artificial world, we can employ the matching mechanism to lead the players to play the Pareto optimal Nash 
equilibrium regardless of  the enforcement cost. And in this sense, matching mechanism plays the role of  equilibrium selection device. 
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Nash equilibrium will be endogenously chosen by the players as a rational prediction; second, given a 
particular matching mechanism, we demonstrate the existence of  certain learning mechanism so that 
the given matching mechanism will be endogenously established by all the players spontaneously in 
the long run. We therefore believe that the present study has supplied an interesting and also 
relatively complete characterization of  the internal relationship between the micro-strategy employed 
by the players and the macro-structure facing the players. 
In the paper, we are encouraged to study the asymmetric normal-form games between two 
heterogeneous groups of  populations under the modified framework of  evolutionary game theory.2 
Each of  the two groups is assumed to have countable many pure strategies. Hyper-rational 
assumptions (see, Aumann, 1976) about the players broadly used in classical non-cooperative game 
theory will be dropped in the present model, instead, the players or individuals play the game 
following certain adaptive learning processes arising from the stochastic replicator dynamics driven 
by Lévy processes for the first time.3 On the contrary, the strategies themselves are supposed to be 
smart and rational enough to optimize their fitness4, which directly depend on the stochastic 
replicator dynamics or the learning processes of  the players, following the classical as if methodology 
from the perspective of  posteriori. And the corresponding control variables of  these fitness- 
optimization problems5 are chosen to be stochastic stopping times or stopping rules, which 
reasonably reflects the fact that strategies themselves are no longer suitable for the roles of  control 
variables as in the best-response correspondences of  Nash equilibria because “strategies” of  the 
players’ strategies will not be well-defined through the traditional approach. Luckily, noting that the 
optimal stopping rules are partially determined and completely characterized by the learning 
processes of  the players, the optimal stopping rules as a whole may be exactly one of  the Nash 
equilibra, no matter it is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium or a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, of  
the original normal-form games derived from the best-response approach.6 Generally speaking, the 
                                                        
2 It will be without loss of  nay generality when focusing on the case of  two heterogeneous groups of  populations by noting that 
two-sided markets broadly exist in reality, for instance, the marriage market and the labor market. 
3 We extend the pioneering stochastic replicator dynamics of  Foster and Young (1990) and Fudenberg and Harris (1992) to Lévy 
processes by emphasizing the role of  jumps in learning processes. Binmore and Samuelson (1999) show the importance of  drift in 
equilibrium selection, and here we point out that jumps not only really happen in social and biological evolution but also play crucial 
role in equilibrium selection. 
4 We prefer fitness to payoff  because payoff  will neglect some important and even determinant factors in equilibrium selection. 
Fitness will be a much more complete characterization of  the objective of  the player than payoff. Fitness not only focuses on the game 
itself  like payoff  but also pays attention to other factors, such as the environment where the game happens and also the importance of  
the game to the players by noting that players usually are faced with many different or alternative games at the same time, which often 
leads to the fact that there exist substitutive and complementary relationship between these games from the perspective of  the players, 
thereby violating the usually implicit assumption that each game is regarded as an isolated one. To sum up, the concept of  fitness will 
capture much more relevant factors of  the game situations facing the players, including objective factors like payoff  structure and also 
subjective factors like the degree of  game participation. 
5 In the current model, we do not incorporate inter-temporal consideration like that of  Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) into the present 
optimization problem because we insist that the present case is of  independent interest. 
6 One major difference between the traditional non-cooperative game theory and evolutionary game theory is that we do not give 
dynamics characterizing the evolution of  the strategy distribution in priori in the former case. In the traditional approach, individually 
and decentralized rational choice leads to the game equilibrium, which implies that strategies themselves are suitable control variables 
for the best response problems to derive Nash equilibria. However, in evolutionary game theory, we give dynamics reflecting the 
learning processes of  the players to characterize the evolution of  total strategy distribution over the populations, then we study certain 
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optimal stopping rules as a whole will not be equal to anyone of  the Nash equilibria, that is, there 
exists certain difference between the both. However, it is confirmed that it is just the difference 
between the optimal stopping rules as a whole and the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of  the 
original normal-form game that established our Pareto optimal endogenous matching. We, hence, to 
the best of  our knowledge, enrich the matching rule widely used in evolutionary game theory by 
naturally adding into economic-welfare implications for the first time.7 
Moreover, it is shown that the well-known random matching (e.g., Maynard Smith, 1982; 
Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; Ellison, 1994; Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995; Weibull, 1995) 
just represents one special and extreme case of  the current endogenous matching and we supply the 
conditions under which the random matching will be asymptotically Pareto efficient.8 Thus, proving the 
existence of  Pareto optimal endogenous matching would be regarded as one innovation of  the 
present paper by noticing the above facts. 
Up to the present step of  our story, we have been provided with a Pareto-optimal endogenous 
matching in the current game situation by solving the above fitness-optimization problems of  the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
limiting distribution, i.e., sending the number of  population to infinity, sending the time to infinity or sending the mistakes to zero, and 
we finally compare it with the classical solution concept like Nash equilibrium. Therefore, if  we argue that the traditional approach 
focuses on strategy-space dimension, evolutionary game theory pays relatively more attention to evolutionary-time dimension (see, 
Binmore and Samuelson, 1997, 1999; Binmore et al., 1995). Evolutionary game theory prefers to study the basin of  attraction (see, 
Ellison, 2000), the steady state (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993) or the rest point of  the evolutionary dynamics or learning processes, we 
argue that optimal stopping rule plays the similar role except that rest point of  dynamics only depends on the properties of  the dynamics 
themselves while optimal stopping rule adding into a rational constraint. To summarize, the traditional approach emphasizes 
micro-strategy from the perspective of  individual choice while evolutionary game theory focuses more on macro-structure from the 
viewpoint of  group evolution, and the method introduced in the present paper will supply a linkage between the both, that is to say, 
optimal stopping rule is partially determined and completely characterized by macro-structure while it is also partially determined by 
micro-strategy. 
7 Existing studies usually focus on the enforcement or reputation mechanism for given matching mechanism (see, Kandori, 1992, for 
instance). Then they explore the corresponding welfare implications of  the enforcement or reputation mechanism. We, however, 
directly examine the welfare implications of  the matching mechanism by noting that it will lead us to the Pareto efficient equilibrium. 
8 For any given game, different matching patterns imply different payoffs for the players. Rather, if  we let the payoffs corresponding 
to random matching, which does work in a perfect world with well-mixed population, denote the benchmark, the payoffs defined by 
any non-random matching would be regarded as certain perturbations to the benchmark-payoffs by noting the linearity of  von 
Neuman-Morgenstern payoff  functions. And in this sense, we argue that random matching just represents a special case where we 
have sent the payoff- perturbations to zero. However, why we argue that non-random matching, especially endogenous matching, is of  
crucial importance? Besides the argument of  Ellison (1993), we point out the following problem, that is, random matching usually 
leads the dynamics or learning processes to equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient and even Pareto inefficient (see, Weibull, 1995, for 
instance). Consequently, in order to prevent the dynamics or learning processes from being attracted into the Pareto inefficient rest 
point, we introduce mutations or perturbations into the dynamics or the learning processes to produce efficient equilibrium (see, 
Canning, 1992; Binmore and Samuelson, 1999). And we show that non-random matching mechanism will be a suitable choice. 
Furthermore, it is easily noticed that most of  the existing literatures (see, Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 
1993, and among others) employ the random matching to study the game played by a large population of  players, however, for the 
games in reality, random matching is much more suitable for the case that consists of  small population of  players, for example, in a 
village or in a community. Let us consider a gift-giving game in a village or in a community, and it is reasonably to suppose that the 
players will interact with each other equally thanks to the reputation effect or enforcement effect. Now, let us consider the same 
gift-giving game with the players coming from two isolated villages or communities, we can easily find that the interacting frequency in 
each village or community will be much higher than that between the two villages or communities. That is to say, this is an imperfect 
world and people live in a highly structured society. To sum up, if  we study the game played by a small population of  players, random 
matching really works, however, if  we study the game played by a large population of  players, random matching should not be directly 
applied to the whole population, and the population should be divided into many sub-populations (see, Young (1993)) and we apply 
random matching to each sub-population while non-random matching will be suitable for the interactions between these 
sub-populations. 
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strategies and then smoothing the possible or potential difference between the corresponding optimal 
stopping rules as a whole and the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of  the original normal-form 
game. In other words, the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of  the original asymmetric normal-form 
game can be actually achieved by the two heterogeneous groups of  populations as a rational solution 
of  the above fitness-optimization problems given the existence of  the Pareto optimal endogenous 
matching. Now, we proceed to the next step of  demonstrating the stability of  the Pareto optimal 
matching given its existence. Noting that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the 
Pareto optimal matching and the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium, we then just need to prove the 
stability of  the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium, and also it will be confirmed that this equivalent 
transformation will apparently and greatly lower the technical requirement. Indeed, we prove that the 
adaptive learning processes will uniformly and robustly converge to the above Pareto optimal Nash 
equilibrium as the time approaching infinity while the errors or stochastic perturbations in the 
learning processes always exist except that they are reasonably controlled in certain region following 
from the martingale property. That is to say, the learning processes will robustly converge to the 
modified9 optimal stopping rules as a whole, i.e., the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium, in the sense 
of  uniform topology as long as the adaptive learning processes exhibit martingale property, which, 
however, can be established by applying the well-known Girsanov Theorem under certain weak 
conditions10. Accordingly, the present paper not only proves the stability of  the Pareto optimal 
endogenous matching but also confirms the following important and also interesting byproduct, i.e., 
we claim: the adaptive learning processes of  the individuals will uniformly and robustly converge to 
the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium, which is exactly the rational solution of  the above 
fitness-optimization problems of  the strategies given the Pareto optimal endogenous matching, of  
the original normal-form game as long as they exhibit martingale property.11 We, hence, argue that 
this conclusion would be regarded as one major contribution of  the current study when compared 
with existing literatures, for example, first, existing literatures12 (see, Canning, 1992; Young, 1993; 
Kandori et al., 1993) proved the similar convergence essentially requiring that the errors or 
perturbations approach zero; second, existing literatures showed that their learning processes will 
either converge to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (e.g., Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993; Benaïm and 
                                                        
9 It is modified by the Pareto optimal endogenous matching. 
10 That is, the Novikov conditions are assumed to be fulfilled. 
11 What’s the aspiration of  this conclusion? We emphasize the following three points: first, endogenous matching mechanism will 
meet the gap between the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium and the limiting behavior of  evolutionary dynamics or adaptive learning 
processes, and this Pareto optimal endogenous matching mechanism is exactly the matching mechanism that requires the least 
information, especially in computation; second, one can directly model stochastic learning processes with martingale property in future 
research; finally, our argument is in line with some of  the existing studies (see, Harsanyi, 1973; Canning, 1992; Fudenberg and Kreps, 
1993; Binmore and Samuelson, 1999) by noting that martingale process itself  is a stochastic process, i.e., there exist persistent 
stochastic perturbations in the corresponding learning processes and hence the payoffs. 
12 Canning (1992) shows that, under certain regularity conditions, the stationary distribution of  the perturbed process converges to a 
stationary distribution of  the unperturbed one. Kandori et al. (1993) show that the stochastic evolutionary learning process defined on 
symmetric 2×2 games selects the risk dominant Nash equilibrium when the mistake probability is small. In his seminal paper, Young 
(1993) shows that the adaptive dynamics defined by random sampling will converge almost surely to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, 
which he specifically names as the stochastically stable equilibrium, when the likelihood of  mistakes goes to zero, otherwise, then the 
limiting distribution will occasionally switches from one pure strategy Nash equilibrium to another pure strategy Nash equilibrium. 
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Hirsch, 1999; Ellison and Fudenberg, 2000, and among others) or a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
(see, Young, 1993; Kandori et al., 1993) depending on the types of  learning processes they specified13 
while the current exploration confirms that convergence always happens under weak conditions and 
also the limit will be a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium given the endogenous matching mechanism, 
thus, we supply a unified framework by introducing the endogenous matching; third, convergence of  
the learning processes not only implies the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in coordination games but 
can also yield cooperation equilibrium in PD games by slightly modifying the endogenous matching 
mechanism,14 which reflects that matching mechanism as well as learning mechanism should be paid 
at least equal attention to in our study;15 forth, the convergence result implicitly argues that the 
learning approach need not to be absolutely different from the traditional rational-approach, 
otherwise, we can tell why the difference exists and what forms the difference, and finally we 
demonstrate that the endogenous matching mechanism will provide us with a practical bridge that 
links the learning approach and the traditional approach, thereby effectively meeting the so-called 
unbridgeable gap; last but not least, our robust convergence happens in a persistently non-stationary 
environment and in the sense of  uniform topology, and hence it is obviously much stronger than 
that of  existing studies (see, Kandori et al., 1993; Young, 1993; Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993; Benaïm 
and Hirsch, 1999) after a quick check. 
Although the major contribution of  the present limited study has been expressed above, the 
following innovations are also worth noticing in some sense. Indeed, the existence and stability of  
the Pareto optimal endogenous matching are not necessarily independent of  each other. For instance, 
on the one hand, one can easily find that the stability assertion intimately depends on the 
characterization of  the existence result by checking the details of  the following proof  in Appendix 
C.16 On the other hand, the expected fitness of  the strategies will also exhibit martingale property if  
the corresponding adaptive learning processes are martingale processes by noting the mathematical 
conclusion that martingale property keeps invariant under affine transformation. To conclude, 
stability produces existence in turn in the following sense, i.e., stability of  the Pareto optimal 
endogenous matching implies the existence of  Pareto optimal matching with fairness because the 
game between different strategies will become a fair-game after the martingale-payoffs being incorporated 
into the game-situations. And this is why the word “fairness” specifically appears in the title of  the 
paper. 
                                                        
13 For example, one major difference between Fudenberg and Kreps’s (1993) model and Young’s (1993) model is that Fudenberg and 
Kreps use a generalization of  fictitious play where the players asymptotically choose the best replies to other players’ past actions 
based upon the entire historical frequencies, while the players base their decisions on limited information in Young’s model. Moreover, 
in contrast to the model of  Fudenberg and Kreps, the players do not always optimize in Young’s model. 
14 Noting that the risk-dominant equilibrium usually has a larger basin of  attraction than the Pareto dominant equilibrium, and 
both-defect is the only Nash equilibrium in PD games, the endogenous matching mechanism truly plays a key role in equilibrium 
selection. 
15 It is compelling that matching mechanism would be regarded as an equilibrium selection device in some sense. Indeed, the current 
study is concerned with the case that matching leads to unique equilibrium. Moreover, the stability of  the matching mechanism implies 
the stability of  the equilibrium selection. 
16 However, similar to that of  Young (1993), the existence of  the endogenous matching does not supply a sufficient condition for the 
convergence and hence stability of  the endogenous matching. 
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Furthermore, the present paper defines a much stronger stability concept of  equilibrium 
strategy and hence matching pattern by naturally combining the traditional interpretation and the 
evolutionary interpretation. Because the strategies are proposed to be as if rational “players” in some 
sense, it is easily discovered below that the optimal stopping rules as a whole is computed by 
satisfying the following two constraints, i.e., individually-rational solution and no blocks exist17, which 
implies certain stability from the concept of  Nash bargaining solution (see, Nash, 1950) in 
cooperative game theory. However, we do not stop here by just focusing on rational requirements of  
stability from the viewpoint of  micro-strategy. We also emphasize the importance of  evolutionary 
interpretation from the group level as a whole, i.e., the macro-structure. We do this by building up new 
adaptive-learning processes via introducing exogenous perturbations into the original learning 
processes, and we prove that the new learning processes and the original learning processes will 
converge to the same equilibrium as the exogenous perturbations approaching zero. We should 
specifically emphasize that the original learning processes themselves are driven by Lévy processes, 
i.e., including both diffusion terms and jump terms. Thus, in order to build up new learning 
processes, all we have to do is to disturb the original drift terms, diffusion terms and the original 
jump terms. Consequently, the new adaptive learning processes are also driven by Lévy processes. To 
summarize, we check the stability from the viewpoint of  macro-structure by not essentially changing 
the errors or perturbations existing in the original learning processes, and we take limit just by 
sending the exogenous perturbations to zero. 
In the next section, some well-known examples of  crucial importance in non-cooperative game 
theory will be presented and discussed to help capture some basic ideas and intuitions of  the formal 
model. Section 3 will construct the formal model, introduce some basic concepts and prove the key 
theorem of  the present paper. Section 4 is used to demonstrate the stability of  the Pareto optimal 
endogenous matching. There is a brief  concluding section. All proofs, unless otherwise noted in the 
text, appear in the Appendix. 
2. Examples 
Before constructing formal models, we will first introduce some well-known and also simple 
examples of  non-cooperative game theory in the current section. And it is believed that these 
examples would help a lot in understanding the formulation in the following section and capturing 
the economic intuitions behind the model for the readers. Moreover, it is worth noting that these 
examples would have effectively reflected some ideas of  the formulation, they are nevertheless far 
                                                        
17 Here, we interpret “no blocks exist” in the following sense, that is, everybody is coordinated to follow the optimal stopping rule in 
each group of  populations and potential departure is avoided.  
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away from representing the whole story of  the current investigation. 
EXAMPLE 1—Classical Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Player 2 
C          D 
   
        
     
 
Figure 1 - Symmetric PD Game 
In Figure 1, C and D are used to denote strategies cooperation and defection, respectively. And it is 
assumed that d a b c   . As usual, the entries in the matrix represent corresponding payoffs of  
player 1 and player 2, respectively, for any given strategy choices. For instance, ( , )c d  implies that 
player 1 will get payoff  c  if  she chooses strategy C given player 2 chooses strategy D, and vice 
versa. And it is well known that (D, D) is the only Nash equilibrium in one-short situations and for 
rational players with common knowledge (see, Aumann, 1976) although (C, C) strictly Pareto 
dominates it. And most of  excellent existing literatures have been devoted to searching for possible 
mechanism, i.e., enforcement mechanism 18 , rational mechanism 19 , learning mechanism 20  and 
evolutionary mechanism21, so that (C, C) will be actually chosen, thereby breaking through the 
so-called dilemma. In the current paper, we study the mechanism of  endogenous matching. Indeed, 
one can easily note below that our approach is equivalent to that of  disturbing payoff  to some extent 
and in some sense. Noting that pure strategy stands for one special case of  mixed strategy, i.e., all 
other pure strategies are given zero-probability weights while the chosen pure strategy with 
one-probability weight. Moreover, by noting the symmetry, we just consider the case that player 2 
chooses to randomize his strategy choice between C and D, i.e., she chooses C with probability p  
and chooses D with probability 1 p  with 0 1p  . Now, as the players are involved in a 
structured society, we introduce endogenous matching by adding   to p  while adding   to 
1 p , that is to say, we get a new weighted form ( ,1 )p p    . And we define the generalized 
                                                        
18 See, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), Kandori (1992), Ellison (1994) and among others. 
19 See, Kreps et al. (1982), Andreoni and Samuelson (2006). 
20 See, Selten and Stoecker (1986), Kirchkamp and Nagel (2007). 
21 See, Axelrod (1984), Fudenberg and Maskin (1990), Young and Foster (1991), Nowak et al. (2004), Imhof  (2005), Imhof  and 
Nowak (2006) and among others. 
 
Player 1 
C a , a  c , d  
D d , c  b ,b  
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expected payoffs of  player 1 by, 
1(EU C, ( ,1 ))p p    ( ) (1 )a p c p      (1 )ap c p   (a )c  , 
And, 
1EU ( D, ( ,1 ))p p    ( ) (1 )d p b p      (1 ) (dp b p d     )b  ,  
where ( )a c   and ( )d b   could be regarded as perturbations of  the expected payoffs of  
strategy C and strategy D, respectively, for player 1 and provided that player 2 randomizes between 
strategy C and strategy D by ( ,1 )p p  with 0  1p  .  Letting 1(EU C, ( ,p  1  
))p   1EU ( D, ( ,1 ))p p    , we obtain    ( ) ( )(1 ) ( )a d p c b p d b c a       . 
Noting that (C, C) Pareto dominates (D, D), we put 1p   and then we get the Pareto optimal 
endogenous matching22  ( , ), ( , )         with ( ) ( )a d d b c a       . And thus, we call (C, C) 
the induced Pareto optimal game equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium induced by the above Pareto optimal 
endogenous matching  ( , ), ( , )        . 
EXAMPLE 2—Asymmetric Prisoner’s Dilemma. 
Player 2 
C          D 
   
        
     
 
 
Figure 2 - Asymmetric PD Game 
Noting that Figure 2 shows an asymmetric PD game, we then must have 21 11a a  22a 12a  and 
12 11 22 21b b b b   . Here we specifically study the asymmetric PD game because asymmetric games 
                                                        
22 One can easily tell the difference between the definition of  matching in the current paper and that in existing literatures. That is to 
say, we use the word “matching” in a generalized fashion because our “endogenous matching” really plays similar role as that of  
matching usually used and understood. Moreover, one can also interpret our definition of  matching in the following way, i.e., we call 
the “disturbance” itself  that essentially induces new matching pattern as the definition of  endogenous matching because we only care 
about the “disturbance” in most cases. 
Player 1 
C 11a , 11b  12a , 12b  
D 21a , 21b  22a , 22b  
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themselves play a very important role in non-cooperative game theory. In particular, asymmetric 
games usually appear in evolutionary game theory where we study the replicator dynamics of  
interacting heterogeneous populations in stationary or fluctuating environments23. Again, (D, D) is 
the unique strictly Nash equilibrium while (C, C) Pareto (or payoff) dominates (D, D). Now, suppose 
that player 2 randomizes between C and D, i.e., she chooses C with probability  2p  while she 
employs D with probability 21 p  with 20 1p  . And, as the players are involved in a structured 
society rather than a well-mixed population, we introduce endogenous matching by adding 2  to 
2p  while adding 2  to 21 p , then we get a new weighted form 2 2 2 2( ,1 )p p    . So, the 
generalized expected payoffs of  player 1 can be expressed as 
1(EU C, 2 2 2 2( ,1 ))p p     
11 2 2 12 2 2( ) (1 )a p a p      11 2 12 2(1 )a p a p   11(a 12 2)a  , 
And, 
1EU ( D, 2( p 2 2 2,1 ))p     
21 2 2 22 2 2( ) (1 )a p a p      21 2 22 2 21(1 ) (a p a p a     22 2)a  ,  
We then get 2 11 21 21 22 12 11( ) ( )a a a a a a        by letting 1(EU C, 2 2( ,1p   2p 2 )) 1EU  
( D, 2( p 2 2 2,1 ))p     and sending 2p  to 1. Similarly, assume that player 1 randomizes 
between C and D, that is, she chooses C with probability 1p  and D with probability 11 p  with 
10 1p  . We incorporate endogenous matching here by adding 1  to 1p  while adding 1  to 
11 p , thereby implying a new weighted form 1 1 1 1( ,1 )p p    . Thus, player 2 exhibits the 
following generalized expected payoffs, i.e.,  
2 (EU C, 1 1 1 1( ,1 ))p p    11 1 1 21 1 1( ) (1 )b p b p       11 1 21 1(1 )b p b p  11(b 21 1)b  , 
And, 
                                                        
23 See, Foster and Young (1990), Weibull (1995), Cabrales (2000), and among others. 
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2EU ( D, 1( p 1 1 1,1 ))p    12 1 1( )b p  22 1 1(1 )b p     12 1 22 1 12(1 ) (b p b p b     22 1)b  ,  
We then get 1   11 12( )b b  12 22 21 111 ( )b b b b   by letting 2 (EU C, 1 1( ,1p   1p 1)) 2EU  
( D, 1( p 1, 1 1 1))p   and sending 1p  to 1. Consequently, we obtain the corresponding Pareto 
optimal endogenous matching rule denoted  1 1 2 2( , ), ( , )         with 1   11 1212 22 21 11b bb b b b    and 2    
11 21 21 22 12 11( ) ( )a a a a a a    . And also, (C, C) can be regarded as the induced Pareto optimal game 
equilibrium in the current game situation. 
EXAMPLE 3—Symmetric Coordination Game. 
Player 2 
I          II 
   
        
     
 
Figure 3 - Symmetric Coordination Game 
We suppose that a d , b c , a d b c    and b a  in Figure 3. Rather, Figure 3 reveals a 
classical symmetric coordination game with the pure strategy space {I, II}. There are three strictly 
Nash equilibria in the game, i.e., two pure-strategy Nash equilibra, denoted (I, I) and (II, II), and one 
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(( ,1 ), ( ,1 ))p p p p   with ˆ b ca c b dp    . Notice that we suppose 
that a d b c   , which implies that equilibrium (I, I) strictly risk dominates (see, Harsanyi and 
Selten, 1988) equilibrium (II, II). Nonetheless, equilibrium (II, II) strictly Pareto (or payoff) dominates 
equilibrium (I, I) since it is assumed that b a . Then we are faced with one of  the most important 
issues in non-cooperative game theory, i.e., multiple-equilibrium problem. Indeed, players in this type of  
coordination game situations have to face the tradeoff between risk and payoff  before making strategy 
choice, which also broadly exists in other economic contexts. As usual, some of  the literatures24 
prefer risk-dominant equilibrium while some others25 prefer Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Obviously, 
the present paper prefers Pareto dominant equilibrium from the viewpoint of  economic welfare and 
our endogenous matching rule will definitely support our preference. Noting that the computation 
algorithm is just the same as that of  Example 1 and Example 2, we omit it. It follows from symmetry 
                                                        
24 See, Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Young (1993), Kandori et al. (1993), Matsui and Matsuyama (1995) and among others. 
25 See, Harsanyi and Selten (1988), Aumann and Sorin (1989), Matsui (1991), Anderlini (1999). 
Player 1 
I a , a  c , d  
II d , c  b ,b  
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that the Pareto optimal endogenous matching can be given by  ( , ), ( , )         with the element 
denoted by ( ) ( )c b b d a c       . And also, we call the Pareto dominant equilibrium (II, II) 
induced game equilibrium in the current sense. 
EXAMPLE 4—Asymmetric Coordination Game. 
Player 2 
L          R 
   
        
     
Figure 4 - Asymmetric Coordination Game 
In Figure 4, 11 21a a , 22 12a a , 11 12b b , 22 21b b , 11 21 11 12( )( )a a b b   22(a  12 22 21)( )a b b , 
22 11a a  and 22 11b b , thus we get that equilibrium (T, L) strictly risk dominates (B, R) while (B, R) 
strictly Pareto dominates (T, L). Accordingly, similar to the above examples, the corresponding Pareto 
optimal endogenous matching reads as follows, i.e.,  1 1 2 2( , ), ( , )         with 1   21 2222 12 11 21b bb b b b    and 
2   12 2222 21 11 12a aa a a a   . Then, (B, R) can be seen as an induced game equilibrium in the present case. 
3. Formulation 
3.1. Set-up and Assumptions 
Let 
1 2I I
A   be the payoff  matrix for row-players and 1 2I IB   be the payoff  matrix for column-players 
with 
1 2I I
A  , 1 2I IB   1 2I I , and 1I , 2I 1 . Here, and throughout the current paper, we study the 
Player 1 
T 11a , 11b  12a , 12b  
B 21a , 21b  22a , 22b  
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replicator dynamics of  1 2I I  normal form games between two groups of  populations. Put 
1 1
1 1
( ) ( )I i
i
M t M t  , where 1 ( )iM t  denotes the number of  strategy- 1i  players at period t . 
Similarly, let 2 2
2 1
( ) ( )I i
i
N t N t  , where 2 ( )iN t  denotes the number of  strategy- 2i  players at 
period t .  
We let 1 1( ) ( ) ( )i iX t M t M t , 2 2( ) ( ) ( )i iY t N t N t  denote the frequencies of  strategies 1i  
and 2i , respectively, with 1 11, 2,...,i I  and 2 21, 2,...,i I . Therefore, the average payoffs of  
strategy 1i  and strategy 2i  are given by  1, ( )u i Y t   1 ( )Tie AY t  and   22 , ( ) ( )T Tiu i X t e B X t , 
respectively, with the superscript “T ” denoting transpose, and  11( ) ( ),..., ( ),iX t X t X t 1..., ( ) TIX t , 
( )Y t   21( ),..., ( ),iY t Y t  2..., ( ) TIY t , and also 1 (0,...,1,...,0)Tie  , 2 (0,...,1,...,0)Tie  , where the 
1i -th entry and 2i -th entry are ones, respectively, for 1 11, 2,...,i I  and 2 21, 2,...,i I . 
Specifically, in the current paper, we employ the following endogenous matching by incorporating 
two vectors, i.e.,  1 1 11,..., ,..., Ti I I       and 21( ,..., i     2 2,..., )I IT    with 
1 1
1 1
0I i
i
   and 2 22 1 0I ii    , into the present model. Now, the generalized average payoffs of  
strategies 1i  and 2i  are rewritten as  1, ( )u i Y t     1 1 1( ) ( )T T Ti i ie A Y t e AY t e A      and 
   
22
, ( ) ( )T Tiu i X t e B X t    2Tie 2( )T T TiB X t e B   , respectively, for 1 11, 2,...,i I  and 
2 21, 2,...,i I . In other words,  1, ( )u i Y t    and  2 , ( )u i X t   can be seen as 1Tie A - 
perturbation and 
2
T T
ie B  -perturbation of   1, ( )u i Y t  and  2 , ( )u i X t , respectively. Moreover, as 
is discussed thoroughly below, both of  the above payoff-perturbations are actually endogenously 
determined, that is, the present paper analyzes the case of  endogenous matching. We emphasize here 
again that the two vectors remaining to be determined are named as endogenous matching not 
because they themselves represent a matching pattern but just because they are the key or essential 
factors that induce new matching pattern. In other words, we only care about what induce new 
matching pattern from existing matching pattern because existing matching is given and new 
matching pattern is also given following from the Pareto optimal standard. Therefore, we without 
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great loss of  generality name the two vectors, to be determined, as the endogenous matching is for 
the sake of  convenience and also with the purpose of  capturing the essence of  the problem facing us. 
To sum up, we argue that, in the present case and in some sense, what the present state is will not be 
important, what the goal will be is also not important, the only important matter we care about is 
what we need to lead us from the present state to our goal. Here, the endogenous matching defined 
by the two vectors meets our need. 
We now denote by  ( ) ( ), ,i iW W    ( )
0 ( )
i
i
W
t
t

  
 ( ), iW   the filtered probability space with 
( )iW    ( )
0 ( )
i
i
W
t
t

  
  the ( )iW   augmented filtration generated by d  dimensional 
standard Brownian motion  ( ),0 ( )i iW t t     with ( )iW   ( )( )iiW   ,    ( )iW   and 
( )i   a stopping time, to be endogenously determined. Moreover, we define 
  ,i iN dt dz     1 1,i iN dt dz  ,...,  , Ti in nN dt dz     
         1 1 1 1, ,..., , Ti i i i i i i in n n nN dt dz dz dt N dt dz dz dt             ,  
in which  
1
ni
l l
N

  
 are independent Poisson random measures with Lévy measures il

  coming 
from n  independent (1-dimensional) Lévy processes 1 ( )
i t   
0
1 1 10
,
t i i iz N ds dz     , …, 
( )in t   
00
,
t i i i
n n nz N ds dz        with 0     0 , and then the corresponding stochastic basis is 
given by  ( ) ( ), ,i iN N     ( )
0 ( )
i
i
N
t
t

  
 ( ), iN   with ( )iN    ( )
0 ( )
i
i
N
t
t

  
  the ( )iN    
augmented filtration and ( )
iN   ( )
( )
i
i
N 
 
 ,   ( )iN    and ( )i   a stopping time, to be 
endogenously determined. Thus, we are provided with a new stochastic basis  , ,i i    
 
0 ( )i
i
t t

   , i , where i  ( )iW   ( )iN   , i  ( )iW   ( )iN  , it   ( )iWt   ( )iNt  , 
i  ( )iW   ( )iN   and i   
0 ( )i
i
t t

    denotes the corresponding filtration satisfying the 
well-known “usual conditions”. Here, and throughout the current paper, i  is used to denote the 
expectation operator with respect to (w. r. t.) the probability law i  for  1,2,...,i I   and 
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for 1, 2  . Naturally, we have stochastic basis  , ,     
0 ( )t t 

   ,   with   I ii    , 
  I ii    , t   I ii t   ,    I ii    , ( )   ( )I ii      ( )I ii      if  1  , and 
( )   ( )I ii      ( )I ii       if  2   with    ,    0 ( )t t      denoting the 
corresponding filtration satisfying the usual conditions, and   is used to denote the expectation 
operator w. r. t. the probability law   for 1, 2  . Furthermore, we are led to the following 
probability space  , ,   0 ( ) ,t t      with 2 1     , 2 1    , 2 1t t    , 
2
1

   , 2 1( ) ( )     with  ,  0 ( )t t      denoting the corresponding 
filtration satisfying the usual conditions, and   is used to denote the expectation operator w. r. t. 
the probability law  . 
We now define the canonical Lebesgue measure   on measure space  ,   B  with 
   0, ,   (0, )  and  B  the Borel sigma-algebra, and also the corresponding 
regular properties about Lebesgue measure are supposed to be fulfilled. Thus, we can define the 
following product measure spaces  i    , i   B  and      ,    B  with 
corresponding product measures   i  and    , respectively, for  1, 2,...,i I   and 
for 1,2  . 
Now, based upon the probability space  , ,i i   i , i  for 1,2  , and following 
Fudenberg and Harris (1992), Cabrales (2000), Imhof  (2005), Benaïm et al (2008), Hofbauer and 
Imhof  (2009), the stochastic replicator dynamics26 of  the two groups of  populations can be 
respectively given as follows, 
   1 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 11 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dM t M t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
        , 
                                                        
26 Throughout, the stochastic replicator dynamics will help us to construct adaptive learning processes for the players following the 
argument of  Gale et al. (1995), Binmore et al. (1995), Börgers and Sarin (1997), and Cabrales (2000). Thus, we will take indifference 
between the stochastic replicator dynamics and the adaptive learning processes. 
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   2 22 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 21 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT T
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dN t N t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
         . 
where 1 ( )iM t  is assumed to be  1i   B adapted, 2 ( )iN t  is  2i   B adapted, ( )Y t  
is also assumed to be  2   B adapted, ( )X t  is  1   B adapted, 1 1 ( )i k t  and 
 11 1 1, ii l lt z  are  1i   B progressively measurable, and 2 2 ( )i k t  and  22 2 2, ii l lt z  are 2i   
B    progressively measurable, for  1 11, 2,...,i I ,  2 21, 2,...,i I ,  1 1, 2,k  1...,d ,   
2 21, 2,...,k d ,  1 11, 2,...,l n  and  2 21, 2,...,l n . Thus, based upon the above SDEs, we get 
the following proposition, 
PROPOSITION 1: The Lyapunov exponents of  the above SDEs are, 
 11 1 1 11 212 101 1lim log ( ) lim ( ) ( )t di Ti i kkt tM t e AY s st t      
      1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 01 log 1 , ,n i i i ii l l i l l l ll s z s z dz ds          a.s. 
And, 
 22 2 2 22 212 101 1lim log ( ) lim ( ) ( )t di T Ti i kkt tN t e B X s st t        
      2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 01 log 1 , ,n i i i ii l l i l l l ll s z s z dz ds            a.s. 
respectively, for 1 (0) 0iM  , 2 (0) 0iN   and  1 11, 2,...,i I ,  2 21, 2,...,i I . Hence, the above SDEs 
are almost surely exponentially stable if  and only if, 
 11 1 11 212 101lim ( ) ( )t dTi i kkt e AY s st     
      1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 01 log 1 , , 0n i i i ii l l i l l l ll s z s z dz ds          . 
And, 
 22 2 22 212 101lim ( ) ( )t dT Ti i kkt e B X s st       
      2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 01 log 1 , , 0n i i i ii l l i l l l ll s z s z dz ds            . 
respectively, for  1 11, 2,...,i I  and  2 21, 2,...,i I . 
PROOF: See Appendix A. ▌ 
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So, we directly provide the following assumption, 
ASSUMPTION 1: Here, and throughout the current paper, we suppose that, 
 11 1 11 212 101lim ( ) ( )t dTi i kkt e AY s st     
      1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 01 log 1 , , 0n i i i ii l l i l l l ll s z s z dz ds          . 
And, 
 22 2 22 212 101lim ( ) ( )t dT Ti i kkt e B X s st       
      2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 01 log 1 , , 0n i i i ii l l i l l l ll s z s z dz ds            . 
always hold. 
Now, based upon Proposition 1 and Assumption 1, we, without loss of  generality, introduce the 
following technical assumption, 
ASSUMPTION 2: Throughout the current paper, both ( )M t  and ( )N t , sufficiently large, are assumed to 
be finite constants. 
REMARK 3.1: Some of  existing literatures (see, Nowak et al., 2004; Imhof  and Nowak, 2006, 
and among others) have confirmed that Assumption 2 has very important implications. That is to say, 
on the one hand, Assumption 2 is used to make things much easier from the viewpoint of  pure 
mathematics; and also, Assumption 2 is indeed without loss of  any generality in the sense of  
economic and biological intuitions on the other hand (see, Fudenberg and Levine, 1993; Young, 1993; 
Binmore et al., 1995; Binmore and Samuelson, 1997). 
Notice from Assumption 2 that the sizes of  the two populations are finite constants, based on 
Itô’s rule one can easily find, 
   1 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 11 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dX t X t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
         
   1 1 1 1 1 1 111
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,n
i i i i i i iT
iX t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz       , 
   2 22 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 21 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,
d n
i i i i i iT T
i i k k i l l l l
k l
dY t Y t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz 
 
               
   2 2 2 2 2 2 222
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,n
i i i i i i iT T
iY t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz        ,             (1) 
subject to the initial conditions, i.e., 1 (0) (0,...,0)i TW   1i  a.s., 2 (0) (0,...,0)i TW   2i  a.s., 
(0)X   1X (0), 1 1..., (0),..., (0) Ti IX X   1 11,..., ,..., Ti Ix x x  0x  1  a.s., (0)Y   1Y (0),  
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2 2..., (0),..., (0) Ti IY Y   2 21,..., ,..., Ti Iy y y  0y   2  a.s., 1 ( )iX t  is assumed to be 
 1i   B adapted, and 2 ( )iY t  is assumed to be  2i   B adapted, for  1i  11, 2,..., I  
and  2i  21, 2,..., I . Moreover, with a little abuse of  notations, we put 1 (0)i   11(0),i  
1 1
..., (0),...,i k 1 1 (0) Ti d   11,i 1 1..., ,...,i k 1 1 Ti d  1i ,  1 10,i iz    111 10, ii z  11 1 1,..., 0, ,...,ii l lz  
 11 1 10, Tii n nz    111 1ii z  11 1 1,..., ,...,ii l lz  11 1 1 Tii n nz   1 1i iz , 2 (0)i   21(0),i 2 2..., (0),...,i k  
2 2 (0) Ti d   21,i 2 2..., ,...,i k 2 2 Ti d  2i , and  2 20,i iz    221 10, ii z ,...,  22 2 20, ii l lz ,...,  
 22 2 20, Tii n nz    221 1ii z ,...,  22 2 2ii l lz ,...,  22 2 2 Tii n nz   2 2i iz , for  1i  11, 2,..., I  and  2i  
 1,2, 2..., I . Moreover, we have, 
       1 1
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,I ndX t f X t dt g X t dW t h X t z N dt dz     , 
       2 2
0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,I ndY t f Y t dt g Y t dW t h Y t z N dt dz     ,               (2) 
with ( )X t   1 11( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti IX t X t X t  and ( )Y t   2 21( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti IY t Y t Y t . 
Next, we are in the position to introduce some necessary assumptions, 
ASSUMPTION 3: The initial conditions 1 (0)iX  1ix 0 , 2 (0)iY  2iy 0 , (0)X  x 0  and 
(0)Y  y 0  are all supposed to be deterministic and bounded for  1i  1, 2, 1..., I  and  2i  1,2, 2..., I . 
Furthermore, 1 0i   1i  a.s., 2 0i   2i  a.s.,  11 1 1, ii l lt z  111 il     1i  a.e., and 
 22 2 2, ii l lt z  221 il     2i   a.e., for  11il 0 , 22il 0  and for  1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 
2i  1,2, 2..., I ; 1l  1,2, ..., 1n  and 2l  1,2, ..., 2n . 
ASSUMPTION 4: The following linear growth and local Lipschitz continuity conditions are fulfilled, 
respectively,, 
         1 1 1 1 1
0
1
22 2 21 1 1 1 1 1 1
22 2 21
, 1
I n
l l l
l
f x g x h x z dz C x

    , 
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         2 2 2 2 2
0
2
22 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2
22 2 21
, 1
I n
l l l
l
f y g y h y z dz C y

    , 
for some constants 1C , 2C   . And, 
       2 21 1 1 1
2 2
f x f x g x g x      
     1 1 1 1 11 1
0
1
2 21( ) 1( )1 1 1 1 1
221
, ,
I n
l l
l l R
l
h x z h x z dz L x x

     , 
       2 22 2 2 2
2 2
f y f y g y g y      
     2 2 2 2 22 2
0
2
2 22( ) 2( )2 2 2 2 2
221
, ,
I n
l l
l l R
l
h y z h y z dz L y y

     , 
for any given constants  1R , 2R 0  with, 1
2 2
x x R  , 2
2 2
y y R  , and constants 11RL , 
2
2
R
L    that depend only on  1R  and 2R , respectively, for all x , x  1I  and y , y  2I  with 
 11( ) 1,lh x z ,  11( ) 1,lh x z  representing the 1l -th columns of  matrixes  1 1,h x z ,  1 1,h x z , respectively, and 
 22( ) 2,lh y z ,  22( ) 2,lh y z  denoting the 2l -th columns of  matrixes  2 2,h y z ,  2 2,h y z , respectively, for 
 1l  1,2, ..., 1n  and 2l  1,2, ..., 2n . 
REMARK 3.2: (i) Provided Assumption 4, the existence and uniqueness of  strong solutions of  
the Lévy SDEs given in (2) are ensured, respectively. 
(ii) Assumption 4 is indeed weak in the following sense, local Lipschitz continuity conditions 
can be naturally satisfied for any 1C  functions or correspondences thanks to the Mean Value 
Theorem. 
(iii) Here, and throughout the current paper, | |  is used to denote absolute value, 2|| ||  is 
used to represent both Euclidean vector norm and the Frobenius (or trace) matrix norm, and     
is used to denote the scalar product. 
3.2. Stochastic Differential Cooperative Game on Time 
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Now, as in the model of  Nowak et al (2004), and Imhof  and Nowak (2006), we define the following 
generalized expected discounted fitness functions27, 
      1 1 11 12( , ), ( ) exp 1 ( )i i i Ti s y if t Y t t w w e A Y t          , 
      2 2 22 21( , ), ( ) exp 1 ( )i i i T Ti s x if t X t t w w e B X t              . 
with 1i , 2i  0,1  ( 1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ) denoting the discounted factors, 1iw , 2iw  
 0,1  ( 1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ) the parameters that measure the contributions of  the 
matrix payoffs of  the game to the fitness of  the corresponding strategies, and 2( , )s y , 1( , )s x  
representing the expectation operators w. r. t. the complete probability law 2 , 1  with depending 
on initial conditions ( , )s y      20,1 I  and ( , )s x      10,1 I , respectively. Thus, the 
problem, after technically modifying the above generalized expected discounted fitness functions, 
facing us can be expressed as follows,28 
PROBLEM 1 (Stochastic Differential Cooperative Game on Time)29: We need to demonstrate that there 
                                                        
27 Indeed, we are not necessary restricted to this type of  specification of  fitness functions, that is, one can employ much more general 
form of  fitness functions. So, we employ this form of  fitness functions is just for the sake of  simplicity and tractability in determining 
the optimal stopping rule defined in the following Problem 1. Moreover, employing this kind of  fitness functions is without loss of  
generality and will provide us with a suitable example to introduce the modeling-idea of  the paper and to help the reader intuitively 
capture the logic implied by the formulation. Generally speaking, much more general form of  objective function will prevent us from 
finding out the “smooth fit” conditions and hence determining the boundary explicitly in a given stochastic optimal-stopping problem 
from the viewpoint of  mathematical technique, and so we leave this branching of  exploration to future research. 
28 In a certain sense, Problem 1 defines a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, which hence could be regarded as a natural 
correspondence to the traditional Dynkin games. 
29 It should be emphasized here that we usually view game equilibrium in evolutionary game theory not from the viewpoint of  
individual choice since we have dropped the hyper-rational hypothesis widely used in classical non- cooperative game theory but 
directly from the viewpoint of  strategies themselves, which can be analogically compared to different genes or cultures, following the 
standard biological evolution theory that strategies will have much more opportunities to survive in competition if  they have much 
higher fitness or one strategy finally survives in posteriori just because it exhibits much higher fitness than any other competitive 
strategies in priori. In other words, if  we employ the classical as if methodology, we directly argue that those strategies are regarded as 
successful in posteriori just because they are much more “rational” than any other unsuccessful strategies and they have been always 
maximizing their fitness in priori. So, the optimization problem defined in Problem 1 corresponds to the strategies but not directly to 
the individuals, who indeed follow adaptive learning mechanism in the current case, although we can apply the definition to both 
without bringing out troubles because the fitness defined in Problem 1 has an equivalent relationship with the payoffs of  the 
individuals when they only employ pure strategies. As matter of  fact, there exists certain subtle action-and-reaction or 
determination-and-redetermination relationship between “rational” strategies and naive individuals, that is, on the one hand, one 
strategy can be seen as a successful strategy or “smart” strategy just because as if  this strategy has successfully attracted much more 
individuals in the population to use it in games, while on the other hand, more and more individuals will actually employ those “smart” 
strategies through imitation and learning since they find that these strategies provide them with much higher payoffs. Thus, those 
individuals have used those unsuccessful strategies will be finally replaced by new-born generations of  the remaining individuals given 
the number of  the population is a constant in the present model. So, in the limit, if  it exists, of  the successful adaptive learning 
processes, the population will consists of  those lucky individuals equipped with successful genes which are represented by successful 
strategies. Then, one can easily find that the limit, if  it exists, of  the successful adaptive learning processes and those successful 
strategies will appear at the same time from the viewpoint of  posteriori. Moreover, noting that we have put as if assumption on those 
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exist two vectors of   stopping times ( )    1 11 ( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti I       and ( )    
 2 21 ( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti I         with    such that, 
  1 11 ( ), ( )i iif Y      
     1 1 1 1 11
1
( , )
( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT
s y iw w e A Y 
     

          , 
     1 1 1 1 11( , ) exp ( ) 1 ( )i i i i iTs y iw w e A Y                . 
And simultaneously, 
  2 22 ( ), ( )i iif X        
     2 2 2 2 22
2
( , )
( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT T
s x iw w e B X 
     

        
       , 
     2 2 2 2 22( , ) exp ( ) 1 ( )i i i i iT Ts x iw w e B X                     . 
with 1 1( ) ( )i k      ( 1 1i k , 1i , 1k  1, 2, 1..., I )  a.s., 2 2( ) ( )i k       ( 2 2i k , 2i , 
2k  1, 2, 2..., I )  a.s., ( , )s y  and ( , )s x stand for the expectation operators depending on initial 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
strategies. Therefore, we conclude that the limit of  the successful learning processes of  those lucky individuals just forms the solution 
of  the fitness-optimization problems of  those smart strategies. In other words, the successful adaptive learning processes will 
definitely converge to the rational solution of  the fitness-optimization problems of  these smart strategies. Correspondingly, the limit 
of  the unsuccessful adaptive learning processes of  those replaced individuals just forms the solution of  those problems of  those 
unsuccessful strategies, and these problems are, as if , not always fitness-optimization problems, or these strategies always made 
mistakes in attracting the individuals from the viewpoint of  posteriori. And in the current model, these replicator dynamics defined in 
(2) will be employed as the adaptive learning processes of  the individuals while Problem 1 corresponds to the as if fitness-optimization 
problems of  the strategies. Rather, in Theorem 2 of  the following section 4, we have proved that the learning processes will uniformly 
and robustly converge to the solution of  the fitness-optimization problems under certain weak conditions. Nonetheless, up to the 
present step, the above story has not been completed. Noting that the fitness-optimization problems are defined for the strategies, thus 
the corresponding control variables naturally will not be these strategies themselves any more. And the present paper shows that 
stopping times or stopping rules will be suitable and useful control variables by noticing the following important fact, i.e., these fitness 
functions of  the strategies directly and heavily depend on the learning processes or replicator dynamics of  the players. Accordingly, the 
essence of  Problem 1 can be expressed as follows, that is, searching for optimal stopping rules for the learning processes of  the 
players according to the interest of  these strategies, and also the essence of  the competition between the two heterogeneous groups of  
populations is the competition between two kinds of  learning processes, and finally the essence of  the competition between the two 
kinds of  learning processes will be valued and characterized by the competition between the column strategies and row strategies, the 
coordination among the column strategies and the coordination among the row strategies, in the original normal-form games. And in 
Theorem 2 of  the following section 4, we have proved that the learning processes will uniformly converge to the optimal stopping 
rules determined by Problem 1 by essentially used the well-known Girsanov Theorem. We will emphasize in the following section 
again that the robust convergence from the learning processes to the rational solutions no longer depends on the requirement that 
errors, noises or stochastic disturbances approach zero, instead, the errors, noises or stochastic disturbances will always exist except 
that they are controlled in certain region following the martingale property. 
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conditions or information ( , )s y  and ( , )s x , respectively. 
   REMARK 3.3: (i) Indeed, 1iw , 2iw  0,1  ( 1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ) can be regarded as 
objective parameters that measure the intensity of  evolutionary selection (see, Ohtsuki et al., 2007), 
and also, this specification reflects the idea that, in reality, individuals or players inclined to use 
different strategies may feel different levels of  importance of  the corresponding game payoff  to 
their fitness, thereby determining different degrees of  participation which in turn will greatly affect 
the strategy choice of  the players.  
(ii) In order to capture the idea behind Problem 1 intuitively, we give the following slightly 
modified expression of  Problem 1, 
On the one hand, for strategy 1i , we call the stopping rule 1 ( )
i   is individually rational if  and 
only if, 
     1 1 11 1
1 ( )
( ) inf 0; ( ) , argsup ( ), ( )
i
i i i
i it Y t y x f Y 
        

       
for  1i  1, 2, 1..., I . Moreover, we argue that the vector of  stopping rules ( )    
 1 11 ( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti I       defines a stable equilibrium if  and only if, 
     1 11 1inf 0; ( ) , ( ) ( ) inf 0; ( ) ,i ki kt Y t y x t Y t y x                 
for  1 1i k , 1i , 1k  1, 2, 1..., I . That is,    1 1, ,i ky x y x        ,y x    y  for  1 1i k , 
1i , 1k  1, 2, 1..., I . To conclude, “individually rational” requires there exists a boundary that defines a 
stopping rule for each strategy, and meanwhile “stable equilibrium” requires that these boundaries 
should be equal to each other from the viewpoint of  group-level or collective behavior.  
On the other hand, for strategy 2i , we call the stopping rule 2 ( )
i   is individually rational if  
and only if, 
     2 2 22 2
2 ( )
( ) inf 0; ( ) , argsup ( ), ( )
i
i i i
i it X t x y f X 
        

     
    
for  2i  1, 2, 2..., I . Furthermore, we name the vector of  stopping rules ( )    
 2 21 ( ),..., ( ),..., ( ) Ti I          a stable equilibrium if  and only if, 
     2 22 2inf 0; ( ) , ( ) ( ) inf 0; ( ) ,i ki kt X t x y t X t x y                 
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for  2 2i k , 2i , 2k  1, 2, 2..., I . That is,    2 2, ,i kx y x y       ,x y   x  for  2 2i k , 
2i , 2k  1, 2, 2..., I . To sum up, “individually rational” requirement is equivalent to the existence of  
one boundary for each strategy while “stable equilibrium” implying that these boundaries should take 
the same value, otherwise, conflict always exists and any given equilibrium consists of  stopping rules 
will not be stable. 
(iii) Rather, the game defined in Problem 1 can be regarded as consisting of  three sub-games, 
i.e., the sub-game between the two groups of  populations, the sub-game in column group and the 
sub-game in row group. The sub-game between the two groups of  populations reflects the idea of  
Nash equilibrium or best-response correspondence, i.e., determining y  given x  and vice versa. 
However, for the sub-games in each group, the key issue is about coordination such that the stable 
equilibrium will be finally achieved. To summarize, for each decentralized and rational individual and 
in the group level, the corresponding Nash equilibrium or best-response strategy y  (given x ) (or 
x  for any given y ) need not be unique. However, there always exist only one population 
distribution y  (given x ) and only one population distribution x  (given y ) for each group, 
respectively, in each period. Accordingly, the in-group bargaining and coordination will finally lead us 
to the unique stable equilibrium denoted     , , ,x y y x      . 
(iv) In other words, the algorithm of  Problem 1 actually implies a non-cooperative game 
sub-problem first and then a cooperative game sub-problem, that is, the Nash equilibrium 
    1 2, , ,i ix y y x       for  1i  1, 2, 1..., I  and  2i  1, 2,  2..., I , which may be not unique in 
theory, will be determined by the non-cooperative game between the two heterogeneous groups of  
populations thanks to the best-response strategy, and finally the unique stable equilibrium 
  , ,x y    ,y x     will be derived via the cooperative game in each of  the two groups. Noting 
that people live in a structured society and the game problem facing us in reality is rare a pure 
non-cooperative game problem or a pure cooperative game problem, for instance and relatively 
speaking, the game problem between two countries will be usually interpreted as a non-cooperative 
game problem while the game problem in each country will be thus interpreted as a cooperative 
game problem, we argue that Problem 1 supplies a good approximation to reality. To be much more 
exact and much deeper, there exist many social equilibria facing us need be established by employing 
both non-cooperative game theory and cooperative game theory, for instance, in the field of  
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international trade and for any two given democratic trading countries denoted   and  , both 
country   and country   consist of  two departments, i.e., export department and import 
department, thus, given the possible optimal strategy of  country  , export department of  country 
  will have a best-response strategy denoted   according to its interest consideration, and also 
import department of  country   will have a best-response strategy denoted  , and vice versa. 
Then we obtain the following four possible or potential Nash equilibria, i.e., ( , )   , ( , )   , 
( , )   and ( , )    from the above between-country non-cooperative game. Obviously, the 
Nash equilibria are not necessary to be unique from the viewpoint of  pure game theory. However, 
there always exists unique equilibrium in reality, that is, only one foreign-policy equilibrium will be 
established and enforced. Then, we turn to the in-country cooperative game and this is naturally 
related to the bargaining and coordination problem. Finally, we will get the unique stable foreign- 
policy equilibrium denoted ( , )  , in which   and   should be the Nash bargaining solutions 
(see, Nash, 1950) or Shapley Values (see, Shapley, 1953) of  export department and import 
department of  country   and country  , respectively. 
(v) It follows from Problem 1 that,  
  1 11 ( ), ( )i iif Y      
     1 1 1 1 11
1 ( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT
i sw w e A Y 
     

           , 
And simultaneously, 
  2 22 ( ), ( )i iif X        
     2 2 2 2 22
2 ( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT T
i sw w e B X 
     

        
         
for  1i  11, 2,..., I  and  2i  1,2, 2..., I . And this implies that we have proposed 
complete-information and symmetric-information assumption in Problem 1. Alternatively, if  we are 
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given another two filtrations denoted  0 ( )t t      and  0 ( )t t       with t t t      
for 0 ( )t     , Problem 1 can be extended to include incomplete information, for example, we 
consider the following optimization problem, 
  1 11 ( ), ( )i iif Y      
     1 1 1 1 11
1 ( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT
i sw w e A Y 
     

           , 
And simultaneously, 
  2 22 ( ), ( )i iif X        
     2 2 2 2 22
2 ( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT T
i sw w e B X 
     

        
         
for  1i  11, 2,..., I  and  2i  1,2, 2..., I . And also, the case of  asymmetric information can be easily 
constructed, for instance, we now consider the following optimization problem, 
  1 11 ( ), ( )i iif Y      
     1 1 1 1 11
1 ( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT
i sw w e A Y 
     

           , 
And simultaneously, 
  2 22 ( ), ( )i iif X        
     2 2 2 2 22
2 ( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT T
i sw w e B X 
     

        
         
for  1i  11, 2,..., I  and  2i  1,2, 2..., I . Moreover, we can set problems implying that there 
exists asymmetric information in each group, for example, 1k 1, 2,  1..., I , we now consider 
the following case, 
  1 11 ( ), ( )i iif Y      
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     1 1 1 1 11
1 ( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT
i sw w e A Y 
     

            
for  1i  11,2,...,k . And, 
  1 11 ( ), ( )i iif Y      
     1 1 1 1 11
1 ( )
sup exp ( ) 1 ( )
i
i i i i iT
i sw w e A Y 
     

            
for  1i  1 1 1, 1,...,k k I . That is to say, filtration  0 ( )t t      implies incomplete information while 
filtration  
0 ( )t t   
    implies private information or inside information. All in all, Problem 1 can be 
naturally extended to study much more cases appear in society by employing more complicated 
mathematical techniques. 
DEFINITION 1 (Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching and Induced Nash Equilibrium): The solution, if  
it exists, to Problem 1 defines a game equilibrium, denoted 
  1 11( , ) ( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , ) ,Ti Ix y x y x y x y           
 1( , ) ( , ),y x y x       2 2..., ( , ),..., ( , ) Ti Iy x y x     . 
with 1 1
1
( , ) 1I i
i
x y     and 2 2
2
( , ) 1I i
i
y x     , induced by stochastic group evolution and 
rational individual choice corresponding to the very general normal form game situations. Suppose 
that we are provided with a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium denoted by  1 11ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ,..., ,..., ) ,i I Tx x x x  
2 21ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ,..., ,..., )i I Ty y y y  with 1 1
1
ˆ 1I i
i
x   and 2 2
2
ˆ 1I i
i
y   in the original normal form game, 
then we arrive at the Pareto optimal endogenous matching by solving the following equations, i.e., 
ˆ( , )x y x    and ˆ( , )y x y   , and we represent the corresponding Pareto optimal endogenous 
matching by ( , )   . Moreover, we call the Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium ˆ ˆ( , )x y  induced Nash 
equilibrium in the current game situations and in some sense. 
REMARK 3.4: (i) Here, and throughout the current paper, we study the game equilibrium by 
employing evolutionary game theory under uncertainty, which implies that the game equilibrium is 
characterized from the viewpoint of  group level, thereby leading to a case where classical optimal 
control theory is not suitable for rational individual choice while stochastic optimal stopping theory 
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is powerful and hence plays a crucial role in proving and characterizing the existence of  the induced 
game equilibrium, and hence the Pareto optimal endogenous matching.  
(ii) Specifically, it is worth noting that there exists intrinsic relationship between the endogenous 
matching and the broadly applied random matching (see, Ellison, 1994; and Weibull, 1995, for 
instance). Notice that the present endogenous matching could be naturally viewed as certain 
perturbation of  the perfect world with well-mixed population to some extent and in some sense, 
random matching indeed represents a special case of  the endogenous matching studied in the paper. 
In other words, if  we suppose that individuals or players play the game in a perfect world rather than 
a structured society, random-matching hypothesis is quite appropriate and also random matching itself  
would be regarded as endogenously determined, i.e., determined by the corresponding game 
environment. Generally speaking and to the best of  our knowledge, random matching is just 
employed as an exogenous matching mechanism which does not imply any welfare standard or will 
be implied by any welfare standard in existing studies (see, Ellison, 1994; and Weibull, 1995, and 
among others). Nevertheless, as an extreme case of  the endogenous matching studied here, random 
matching itself  indeed yields economic-welfare implications. For example, if  we can establish that 
0lim ˆ( , )x y x    and 0 ˆlim ( , )y x y     , we can definitely call the corresponding random 
matching asymptotically Pareto efficient (or Pareto optimal). As is well known, people live in a structured 
society and thus random matching only works as certain limit of  the endogenous matching. And 
random matching will be supplied with much richer economic intuitions and implications as long as 
it is studied in a way intimately related to the present endogenous matching. All in all, game rule is 
implied by the society structure30 in some sense and the society structure rather implies certain 
economic-welfare implication, so our study of  endogenous matching deepens the present study of  
matching theory. 
(iii) Intuitively, we name the matching mechanism here endogenous matching just because it is 
determined by other parameters of  the model, say, the payoff  structures, the discount factors, the 
parameters that measure the contribution of  the payoffs to the fitness, and also the stochastic 
volatility. In other words, endogenous matching can be written as a function of  the above parameters, 
and, if  motivated, we can even take comparative static analyses after complicated computations. 
3.3. Existence of  Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching 
To do this, we now define  ( ) , ( )Z t s t X t   for  t    with (0)Z  ( , )s x      10,1 I , 
                                                        
30 It should include both spatial structure and division structure of  any given mature market. 
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and  ( ) , ( )Z t s t Y t  for  t    with (0)Z  ( , )s y      20,1 I . And also we let, 
( , )f s x   1 1 1( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , )i I Tf f fx x xs x s x s x       ,  
 1 1 11 11( ) ,l l lx x z  ...    1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1, ,..., Ti i I Ii l l I l lx z x z  ,  
( , )f s y   1 2 2( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , )i I Tf f fy y ys y s y s y     , 
And, 
2l
 ( )y       2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 11 ,..., ,..., Ti i I Il l i l l I l ly z y z y z     . 
Then the characteristic operators of  ( )Z t  and ( )Z t  can be respectively given by, 
     1 11 1 1 11 1 1
1 1
22
2
1 1
1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 ( )
I I Ti i i iT
i i i
i i
f f ff s x s x x e Ay s x x s x
s x x
 
 
       
    
    1 1 1 11 1 1 1
0
1 11 1
, ( ) ( , ) ( , ), ( )
I n
k k
l l l l
k l
f s x x f s x f s x x dz  
 
         , 
 f   1 12 IC  . 
And, 
     2 22 2 2 22 2 2
2 2
22
2
1 1
1( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
2 ( )
I I Ti i i iT T
i i i
i i
f f ff s y s y y e B x s y y s y
s y y
 
 
           
    2 2 2 22 2 2 2
0
2 21 1
, ( ) ( , ) ( , ), ( )
I n
k k
l l l l
k l
f s y y f s y f s y y dz  
 
        , 
 f   2 12 IC  . 
Furthermore, we let 1 1
1
1
11
I i
i
x   , then 1 11Ix    with 10 1   by noting that 1 11 1I ii x 1 . 
Let 1 1
1
2
21
I i
i
x   , then we can get 1 1 1 2Ix      with 2 10 1    . Inductively, we let 
1 1 1
11
( 2)
21
I I i
Ii
x     , then we have 1 1( 3)3 I Ix x    1 13 2I I    with 0  1 2I   1 3I   ...  1 1  ; 
let 1 1 1
11
( 1)
11
I I i
Ii
x     , i.e., 1x 1 1I  , then we get 2x  1 1( 2)I Ix    1 2I  1 1I   with 0  1 1I    
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1 2I
   1 3I   ...  1 1  . And without loss of  any generality, we put 0 1  . Then we obtain, 
     12 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
1
2 1 2 2 2 1
3
, ( )
I
T T T T
i i i i I i i I i I i i
i
u i x e B x b b x b b e B        

          . 
Similarly, notice that 2 2
2 1
I i
i
y 1  and let 2 22 1 11I ii y    , then we have 2Iy  11    with 0   
1 1 . Let 2 2
2
2
21
I i
i
y    , then we see that 2 1 1 2Iy       with 0   2 1 1    . Inductively, let 
2 2 2
22
( 2)
21
I I i
Ii
y      , then we have 2 2( 3)3 I Iy y    2 3I  2 2I    with 0  2 2I   2 3I   ...   
1 1  ; let 2 2 2 22
( 1)
11
I I i
Ii
y      , i.e., 1y 2 1I   , then it follows that 2y  2 2( 2)I Iy    2 2I  2 1I    
with 0 
2 1I
   2 2I   2 3I   ...  1 1 . And we, without loss of  any generality, put 0 1  . Then 
we get, 
     21 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
2
1
1 1 2 2 2 1
3
, ( )
I
T T
i i i i I i i I i I i i
i
u i y e A y a a y a a e A        

             . 
Therefore, the discounted fitness functions in Problem 1 can be rewritten as, 
   11 1, exp iif s y s   
            21 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
2
1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
I
i i T
i i i I i i I i I i i
i
w w a a y a a e A      

                   , 
                                                          1i  1, 2, 1..., I . 
   22 1, exp iif s x s    
            12 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
I
i i T T
i i i I i i I i I i i
i
w w b b x b b e B      

                  , 
                                                           2i  1, 2, 2..., I . (3) 
with 0 
2 1I
   2 2I   2 3I   ...  1 0 1   and 0  1 1I   1 2I   1 3I   ...  1  0 1 . And 
inspection of  the fitness functions given in (3) reveals that one can just define  1( ) , ( )Z t s t X t   
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for  t    with (0)Z   1,s x     0,1 , and  1( ) , ( )Z t s t Y t  for  t    with 
(0)Z   1,s y     0,1 . And hence the corresponding characteristic operators of  ( )Z t  and 
( )Z t  are respectively given by, 
       1 1 1 11 1, , ,Tf ff s x s x x e Ay s xs x   
       221 1 1 11 21 ,2 ( )T fx s xx   

 
           1 11 1 1 1 1 1
0
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
, , ,
n
f
l l l l l lx
l
f s x x z f s x x z s x dz     


  , 
 f   2 2C  . 
And, 
       1 1 1 11 1, , ,T Tf ff s y s y y e B x s ys y         
221 1 1 1
1 2
1 ,
2 ( )
T fy s y
y
      
           2 12 2 2 2 2 2
0
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
, , ,
n
f
l l l l l ly
l
f s y y z f s y y z s y dz         
 f   2 2C  . 
Therefore, based upon the above assumptions and specifications, the following theorem is 
derived, 
THEOREM 1: There exists a unique solution to Problem 1 under very weak conditions, and accordingly the 
existence of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching is confirmed provided that we are given a Pareto optimal Nash 
equilibrium  ˆ ˆ,x y , which is given in Definition 1. 
PROOF: See Appendix B. ▌ 
REMARK 3.5: (i) It is especially worth noting that Theorem 1 not only shows the existence of  
the Pareto optimal endogenous matching and induced Nash equilibrium given by Definition 1 but 
also provides us with the explicit time length needed so that the Pareto optimal endogenous matching 
and also the induced Nash equilibrium can be achieved by decentralized players. Moreover, it is also 
worth emphasizing that our conclusion holds true for any Pareto optimal strategy combination of  very 
general normal form games although we have only considered Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in 
Theorem 1. For instance, (cooperation, cooperation) is a Pareto optimal strategy combination in PD 
games although it is generally not a Nash equilibrium at all. Obviously, our endogenous matching 
rule can lead us to cooperation in PD games. 
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(ii) Furthermore, it follows from proving the existence of  the Pareto optimal endogenous 
matching that we have provided an algorithm for computing equilibria in asymmetric normal-form 
games with countable many strategies and players. Actually, we just need to solve a group of  linear 
equations. 
4. Stability 
In what follows, we are encouraged to show the stability of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching. 
And we do so by first giving the following definition, 
DEFINITION 2 (Unit Simplex of  Evolutionary Dynamics): Here, and throughout the present 
paper, we put  22 2
2 1
; 1II i
i
y y      and  11 11 1; 1II iix x       as the unit simplexes of  
the evolutionary dynamics defined in (2). Moreover, we let  int   and  int   denote the interiors of  
  and  , respectively. 
4.1. Convergence of  Induced Game Equilibrium 
In the present section, we consider the convergence of  the induced Nash equilibrium, denoted 
ˆ( , )x y x     and ˆ( , )y x y    . It follows from (1) that, 
   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,n
i i i i i i i iT
idX t X t e AY t dt t dW t t z N dt dz        , 
   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 222
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,n
i i i i i i i iT T
idY t Y t e B X t dt t dW t t z N dt dz         .            (1’) 
for  1 11, 2,...,i I  and 2 21, 2,...,i I . Now, we need the following assumptions, 
ASSUMPTION 5: It is reasonable to suppose that there exist processes    1 1 1 11 1, , ,...,i i i it z t z   
   1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1, ,..., , Ti i i i nl l n nt z t z    with  1 11 1, 1i il lt z   and 1 1( )i dt   that are 1i  predictable such 
that for any 0T  , 
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•      11 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
1 1
( ) ( ) , , ( )
n
i i i i i i i T
i l l l l l l i
l
t t t z t z dz e AY t   

   ,   1i  a.e. 
• 1
2
20
( )
T i t dt   , 1i  a.s. 
•       1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1
0
1
2
0 21
log 1 , ,
n T i i i i i i
l l l l
l
t z t z dz dt

         , 1i  a.s. 
for a.a.   1( , ) 0, it T   , and for  1 11, 2,...,i I . 
ASSUMPTION 6: It is, similar to Assumption 5, assumed that there exist processes  2 2,i it z   
  2 21 1, ,...,i it z    2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2, ,..., , Ti i i i nl l n nt z t z      with  2 22 2, 1i il lt z   and 2 2( )i dt    that are 
2i  predictable such that for any 0T  , 
•      22 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0
2 1
( ) ( ) , , ( )
n
i i i i i i i T T
i l l l l l l i
l
t t t z t z dz e B X t   

     ,   2i  a.e. 
• 2
2
0 2
( )
T i t dt    , 2i  a.s. 
•       2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2
0
2
2
0 21
log 1 , ,
n T i i i i i i
l l l l
l
t z t z dz dt

           , 2i  a.s. 
for a.a.   2( , ) 0, it T   , and for  2 21, 2,...,i I . 
Now, letting, 
      11 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1
0
1
0
1
( ) exp log 1 , ,
n ti i i i i i i
l l l l l l
l
t s z s z dz ds

          
        1 1 1
2
20 0
( ) ( ) ( )
t ti i is dW s s ds     
            1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1
0
1
0
1
log 1 , ,
n t i i i i
l l l l
l
s z N ds dz

     , 
And, 
      22 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2
0
2
0
1
( ) exp log 1 , ,
n ti i i i i i i
l l l l l l
l
t s z s z dz ds

            
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        2 2 2
2
0 0 2
( ) ( ) ( )
t ti i is dW s s ds      
                2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2
0
2
0
1
log 1 , ,
n t i i i i
l l l l
l
s z N ds dz

      , 
And then we define new measures 1i  and 2i  on 1iT  and 2iT , respectively, by, 
1 1 1( ) ( , ) ( )i i id T d     , 
2 2 2( ) ( , ) ( )i i id T d     , 
i.e., 1 ( , )i T  and 2 ( , )i T  are the well-known Radon-Nikodym derivatives. By Assumption 5 
and 6, 1 ( , )i T  and 2 ( , )i T  satisfy the following Novikov conditions, respectively, 
  11 1 1 11 1
0
1
2
1
2 20 0
1
exp ( ) 1 ,
nT Ti i i i
l l
l
t dt t z

          
       1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1log 1 , ,i i i i i il l l l l lt z t z dz dt      , 
And, 
  22 2 2 22 2
0
2
2
1
2 0 2 0
1
exp ( ) 1 ,
nT Ti i i i
l l
l
t dt t z

           
       2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2log 1 , ,i i i i i il l l l l lt z t z dz dt       . 
Thus, according to the well-known Girsanov Theorem for Lévy processes, 1i  and 2i  are new 
probability measures on 1iT  and 2iT , respectively, and 1 ( )iX t , 2 ( )iY t  will be martingales w. r. t. 
the probability laws 1i  and 2i , respectively. We will denote by 1 1ii , 2 2ii  the expectation 
operators w. r. t. the probability laws 1i  and 2i , respectively, for  1i  1, 2, 1..., I  and 
2i  1,2, 2..., I . Moreover, we let 1 2     with 1  1 11 1I ii    and 2 222 1I ii    . And now 
we are given a stochastic basis  , ,    0t t T  ,  with   representing the corresponding 
expectation operator. Define, 
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       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 , , ,ii i i i i i i il l l l l l llN ds dz s z dz ds N ds dz   , 
1 1 1
1 ( ) ( ) ( )i
i i idW s s ds dW s   . 
And, 
       2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 , , ,ii i i i i i i il l l l l l llN ds dz s z dz ds N ds dz    , 
2 2 2
2 ( ) ( ) ( )i
i i idW s s ds dW s   . 
for 1i  1, 2, 1..., I ; 2i  1,2, 2..., I ; 1l  1,2, ..., 1n  and 2l  1,2, ..., 2n . Thus, with these new 
compensated Poisson random measures and Brownian motions, (1’) can be rewritten as follows, 
   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 11
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,i in
i i i i i i i idX t X t t dW t t z N dt dz        , 
   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 22
0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,i in
i i i i i i i idY t Y t t dW t t z N dt dz        .                      (1’’) 
for  1 11, 2,...,i I  and 2 21, 2,...,i I . Now, we slightly modify Problem 1 given in section 3 and 
give, 
PROBLEM 2 (Stochastic Differential Cooperative Game on Time): To solve Problem 1 subject to the 
new stochastic differential dynamics given by (1’’). 
Hence, employing the similar proof  of  Theorem 1, we derive, 
COROLLARY 1: There exists a unique solution to Problem 2 under very weak conditions, and accordingly the 
existence of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching is confirmed provided that we are given a Pareto optimal Nash 
equilibrium  ˆ ˆ,x y , and we still denote it by ˆ( , )x y x     and ( , )y x    yˆ   as are given in 
Definition 1. 
Therefore, based upon the above assumptions and constructions, we derive the following 
theorem, 
THEOREM 2: Provided Corollary 1 and for  ˆ( , )x y x     and ( , )y x    yˆ  . Then we 
always get that both ( )X t  and ( )Y t  converge in 1( )L   with their limits belonging to the space 1( )L  , and 
particularly, we arrive at, 
(i) ( )X t  uniformly converges to ( , )x y     a.s., or equivalently, 
2
lim ( ) ( , ) 0
t
t t
X t x y     
         . 
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for    . 
(ii) ( )Y t  uniformly converges to ( , )y x      a.s., or equivalently, 
2
lim ( ) ( , ) 0
t
t t
Y t y x     
       
  . 
for    . 
PROOF: See Appendix C. ▌ 
REMARK 4.1: (i) It is especially worth emphasizing that Theorem 2 holds true for any 
ˆ( , )x y x     and any ˆ( , )y x y     no matter  ˆ ˆ,x y  is a completely mixed-strategy 
equilibrium, a non-completely mixed-strategy equilibrium or a pure-strategy equilibrium in the 
original normal-form games. However, for ˆ( , )x y x    int   and  ˆ( , ) inty x y     , we 
usually need to prove that there exists a unique invariant probability measure on the spaces  int   
and  int  , respectively. For more details, one can refer to Theorem 2.1 of  Imhof  (2005), Theorem 
3.1 of  Benaïm et al. (2008) and Theorem 5 of  Schreiber et al (2011). Moreover, it follows from 
Theorem 1 that  ˆ ˆ,x y  need not be a Nash equilibrium, for instance, (cooperation, cooperation) in 
PD games, and even not an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of  the original game thanks to the 
specification of  Problem 1. Noting that Theorem 2.1 of  Imhof  (2005) only holds for interior ESS 
and Theorem 3.1 of  Benaïm et al. (2008) only holds for the attractor of  the corresponding replicator 
dynamics, we argue that the method employed in demonstrating Theorem 2 has enriched existing 
literatures. 
(ii) As is well known, mixed equilibria are usually interpreted as the limits of  some learning 
process arising from fictitious play with randomly perturbed payoffs in the manner of  Harsanyi’s 
(1973) purification theorem (e.g., Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993; Benaïm and Hirsch, 1999; Ellison and 
Fudenberg, 2000, and among others). Nonetheless, there exist some problems that prevent the 
convergence of  learning mechanisms to a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (see, Jordan, 1993). 
Moreover, Benaïm and Hirsch’s (1999) study shows that there are robust parameter values giving 
probability zero of  convergence for Jordan’s 3×2 matching game. Obviously, our results, which 
essentially based upon the specification of  Problem 1 and the martingale property of  the 
corresponding replicator dynamics, applied to much broader cases. Last but not least, our conclusion 
in Theorem 2 proved the convergence of  game equilibrium in the sense of  uniform topology, which is 
much stronger than that of  existing literatures. 
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(iii) One may notice that we take the limits in Theorem 2 just by sending the time to infinity but 
not through letting the diffusion terms or the jumps terms in replicator dynamics or the adaptive 
learning processes approach zero, instead, noises, errors or stochastic disturbances of  the replicator 
dynamics always exist except that they are reasonably controlled in certain region according to the 
martingale property. 
4.2. Stable Endogenous Matching 
It follows from (1) that, 
     1 1
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,I ndX t X t F Y t dt X t G t dW t X t H t z N dt dz              (4) 
     2 2
0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,I ndY t Y t F X t dt Y t G t dW t Y t H t z N dt dz             (5) 
where   denotes the Hadamard product. Now, we introduce the following Lévy SDEs, 
     1 1
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,I ndX t X t F Y t dt X t G t dW t X t H t z N dt dz              (6) 
     2 2
0
2 2 2 2 2 2 2ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,I ndY t Y t F X t dt Y t G t dW t Y t H t z N dt dz             (7) 
where we have used the following assumption, 
ASSUMPTION 7: For any 1 0  , 2 0  , we suppose that, 
2
1 1 1 1
2 2
ˆˆsup ( ) ( ) sup ( ) ( )
I ty
F y F y G t G t

  

   
1 1 1
0
1 1 1 1 1
2( , )
ˆsup , ,
I nt z
H t z H t z 
 
  
 
, 
And, 
1
2 2 2 2
2 2
ˆˆsup ( ) ( ) sup ( ) ( )
I tx
F x F x G t G t

  

   
2 2 2
0
2 2 2 2 2
2( , )
ˆsup , ,
I nt z
H t z H t z 
 
  
 
. 
In other words, we call (6), (7) 1   and 2  perturbations of  (4) and (5), respectively. 
Moreover, we give, 
ASSUMPTION 8: We suppose that there exist constants 1K , 2K    and 1Kˆ , 2Kˆ    such that, 
 
12 1 1
0
22 21 1 1 1 1
2 2 2( , )
sup ( ) sup ( ) sup ,
I I nty t z
F y G t H t z K
   
  
  
, 
 
21 2 2
0
22 22 2 2 2 2
2 2 2( , )
sup ( ) sup ( ) sup ,
I I ntx t z
F x G t H t z K
   
  
  
, 
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And also, 
   1 11 1 1 1
00
1
1 1 1 1 1
1
ˆ
I n
I n
l l
l
dz dz K 

   , 
   2 22 2 2 2
00
2
2 2 2 2 2
1
ˆ
I n
I n
l l
l
dz dz K 

   . 
ASSUMPTION 9: To ensure that the replicator dynamics given in (2) remain on   and  , i.e.,   and 
  are invariant, respectively, we assume that for each x , the drift vector 1( )f x , the diffusion terms 
11( ) ( )kg x  ( 1 1 11, 2,...,k I d ) and the jump terms  11( ) 1,lh x z  ( 1 1 11, 2,...,l I n ) are elements of  the tangent 
space T   11 1
1 1
; 0II i
i
r r   of   , and also for each y , the drift vector 2 ( )f y , the diffusion 
terms 22( ) ( )kg y ( 2 2 21, 2,...,k I d ) and the jump terms  22( ) 2,lh y z ( 2 2 21, 2,...,l I n ) are elements of  the 
tangent space T   22 2
2 1
; 0II i
i
r r    of   . 
Then, the following proposition is established, 
PROPOSITION 2: Based upon the above constructions and assumptions, suppose ˆ(0) (0)X X  and 
ˆ(0) (0)Y Y , then we have, 
(i) 
21
20
ˆlim sup ( ) ( ) 0
T t T
X t X t  
      as 
1 0  . 
(ii) 
22
20
ˆlim sup ( ) ( ) 0
T t T
Y t Y t  
      as 
2 0  . 
PROOF: See Appendix D. ▌ 
REMARK 4.2: It should be pointed out here that in the proof  of  Proposition 2, we have 
implicitly used the following facts or assumptions, i.e., the speed of    approaching zero is much 
faster than that of  time T  approaching infinity and also 0 0 . Moreover, we can get the same 
conclusion by taking the limit as 0   first and then as T  . 
Provided the above preparations, the following stability theorem of  Pareto- optimality 
endogenous matching can be established, 
THEOREM 3 (Stable Endogenous Matching): No matter the corresponding Pareto optimal Nash 
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equilibrium is a completely mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, a non-completely mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, or 
just a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, there always exists stable endogenous matching that is Pareto optimal based 
upon Theorem 2 and Proposition 2. 
PROOF: We take ˆ ( )X t  for example. And indeed, to prove the theorem, one only need to 
notice the following facts, i.e., for 2p   and p , 
   
2 2
ˆ ˆ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
p p
X t x y X t X t X t x y          
  1 2 2ˆ2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ,p pp X t X t X t x y        
And also, most importantly, proving the stability of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching   is 
equivalent to prove the stability of   ,x y     by noting that there exists a one-to-one 
correspondence between  ,x x y      and  . Then, combining Proposition 2 with Theorem 
2 will easily confirm Theorem 3. The details are left to the interested reader. ▌ 
REMARK 4.3: Theorem 3 combines with Theorem 1 actually supplies us a standard of  stability 
much stronger than that of  existing literatures. For example, classical non-cooperative game theory 
builds the strategic stability of  equilibria on the basis of  rational assumption, no matter it is common 
knowledge, forward induction or backward induction (see, Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986; and van 
Damme, 1987, and among others). On the other hand, evolutionary game theory builds up its 
stability of  equilibria upon the concepts of  evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) (e.g., Maynard Smith, 
1982; Axelrod, 1984; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1990; Samuelson and Zhang, 1992; Weibull (1995) and 
references therein) or stochastically stable equilibrium (e.g., Foster and Young, 1990; Young and 
Foster, 1991; Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; and Young, 1993, and among others). In the current study, 
Theorem 1 follows the classical individually-rational assumption, i.e., expected payoffs or fitness 
functions are maximized, and also Theorem 3 confirms stability of  the endogenous matching from 
the view of  point of  evolutionary interpretation, i.e., the continuous time Markov process arising 
from the replicator dynamics will stably converge to the Pareto optimal equilibrium in the sense of  
uniform topology and so we argue that the endogenous matching is stable because there exists a 
one-to-one correspondence between the game equilibrium and the matching. Noting that individual 
choice usually bases on rational decision while group of  populations as a whole follows stochastic 
evolution, we emphasize again that Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 indeed provide us with a complete 
characterization of  the stability of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching. To summarize, the 
present paper introduces the following stronger definition of  stability, that is, we call a given 
equilibrium or matching stable if  and only if  it is both individually rational and it satisfies group-level 
stochastic evolutionary stability. 
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5. Conclusion 
What’s the directing philosophy insisted by the present exploration? Rather, throughout the present 
paper, we insist and emphasize the following philosophy, i.e., relatively speaking, both what the 
present state is and what the goal will be are not at all important, the only thing that does matter is 
what we will need to lead us from the present state to the goal. Indeed, in the present framework and 
given the problem facing us, the Pareto optimal endogenous matching defined and derived by us just 
plays the key and essential role in leading us from any given present state to our given goal. We 
therefore argue that the definition of  endogenous matching employed by the paper is not only for 
the sake of  convenience of  expression but also reflecting the above practical philosophy. 
In the present paper, we are encouraged to study the asymmetric normal-form games between 
two heterogeneous groups of  populations by incorporating stochastic optimal stopping theory into 
the stochastic replicator dynamics for the first time, thereby defining a stochastic differential cooperative 
game on time. It is demonstrated that optimal stopping theory will play a crucial role in studying the 
endogenous matching from the viewpoint of  evolutionary game theory. Existence of  Pareto optimal 
endogenous matching has been proved and also the corresponding stability is confirmed by 
employing two important standards: individually-rational standard and stochastic evolutionary stable 
standard. 
Finally, the current paper can be naturally extended in the following ways, first, asymmetric 
information can be introduced into the present model to capture much more economic implications; 
second, stochastic differential cooperative game can be explored based upon the present framework; 
third, specific mechanism, say, reputation mechanism or searching mechanism, can be incorporated 
into the model to support any other pattern of  endogenous matching; forth, our approach can be 
easily extended to include multiple priors (see, Riedel, 2009, for instance) and also to explore the 
evolutionary equilibria on graphs (see, Ohtsuki et al., 2007, and among others). 
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Appendix 
A. Proof  of  Proposition 1 
We take 1 ( )iM t  for example. For any 1 (0) 0iM  , we, by applying Itô’s rule to 1 ( )iM t , arrive at, 
 11 1 1 1 11 212 10log ( ) log (0) ( ) ( )t di i Ti i kkM t M e AY s s     
      1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 01 log 1 , ,n i i i ii l l i l l l ll s z s z dz ds          
    1 11 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 101 10 0( ) ( ) log 1 , ,t td ni i i ii k k i l l l lk ls dW s s z N ds dz                   (A.1) 
Applying the classical Large Number Theorem of  martingales reveals that, 
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1 1
1 1 11 10
1lim ( ) ( ) 0
t d i
i k kkt
s dW s
t
   a.s. 
And, 
    1 1 1 11 1 1 1 110 101lim log 1 , , 0t n i i ii l l l llt s z N ds dzt       a.s. 
Dividing both sides of  (A.1) by t  and then letting t   we hence obtain the desired assertion in 
Proposition 1. ▌ 
 
B. Proof  of  Theorem 1 
STEP 1: For strategy 1i ,  1 11, 2,...,i I . Notice that, 
   1 11 1, expi iif s y s     
   21 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
2
1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
I
i i T
i i i I i i I i I i i
i
w w a a y a a e A      

                    
     1 1 1 11 1 1 2exp 0i iT T i iy e B x s w a a     
   1 1 1 1 11 1 2i iT T i ie B x w a a y    
   21 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
2
2 2 1
3
1
I
i i i i T
i I i i I i I i i
i
w w a a e A        

            . 
 
Case 1.1: 
   
   
2
1 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
2
1
1 1
2 2 1
3
1 2 1
1 0
sgn sgn
I
i i i i T
i I i i I i I i i
i
iT T
i i
w w a a e A
e B x a a
     

   

              
   

 
Then, 
 
1
1, 0if s y   
   
   
21 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 12
1 1
1 1
2 2 131
1 1 2
1 Ii i i i Ti I i i I i I i ii
i iT T
i i
w w a a e A
y
e B x w a a
     

   
         
   
 . 
Hence, we have, 
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        
21 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 121
1 1
1 1
2 2 131 1
1 1 2
1
, ;
Ii i i i T
i I i i I i I i iii
i iT T
i i
w w a a e A
U s y y
e B x w a a
     

   
             
   
 .  (B.1) 
And it is natural to guess that the continuation region 1iD  has the following form, 
    1 1 11 1 1 1, ;0i i iD y s y y y    . 
where, 
   
   
21 1 1 1
1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 12
1 1 1
1 1
2 2 131
1 1 2
1 Ii i i i Ti I i i I i I i ii
i i iT T
i i
w w a a e A
y
e B x w a a
     

   
        
   
 .              (B.2) 
Notice that the generator of  ( )Z t  is given by, 
       1 1 1
1
2
21 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2
1,
2 ( )
Ti i iT T
i s y y e B x ys y y
              
           2 111 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
0
2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
, , ,i
n
i l l i l l l ly
l
s y y z s y y z s y dz           
for  
1
1,i s y   2 2C  . If  we try a function 1i  of  the following form, 
      111 1 1, exp iii s y s y     for some constant 1i  . 
We then get, 
         1 11 1 11 11 1 1 11, exp i ii i iT Ti s y s y e B x y y           
       11 12 21 1 1 11 12
iT i iy y
        
         12 1 112 2 2 2 2 2
0
2
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
i i in
i
l l l l l l
l
y y z y z y y dz
     

              
    11 111exp ii iis y h   . 
where, 
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       1 1 1 1 11 1 11 1 12 Ti i i i iT Tih e B x             
     12 12 2 2 2 2 2
0
2
1 1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1
in
i
l l l l l l
l
z z dz
   

           . 
Note that, 
1
1 1
(1) iT Tih e B x    and  111limi iih    . 
Therefore, if  we assume that, 
1
1
iT Te B x  ,                                                            (B.3) 
Then we find that there exists 1 1i   such that, 
 11 0iih   .                                                            (B.4) 
with this value of  1i  we put, 
       
1
1
1
1
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1 1
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i is T
i i i I i i I i I i i i
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e C y y y
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e w w a a y a a e A y y



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 
 
   

                      
   
 
for some constant 1 0iC  , to be determined. We, without loss of  any generality, guess that the value 
function is 1C  at 
1
1 1
iy y
  and this leads us to the following “high contact” conditions, 
     211 1 11 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
2
1 1
1 2 2 2 1
3
1
i I
i i i T
i i i i i I i i I i I i i
i
C y w w a a y a a e A
         

               
(continuity at 
1
1 1
iy y
 ) 
   11 1 11 1 111 1 2ii i ii i iC y w a a     (differentiability at 11 1iy y  ) 
Combining the above equations shows that, 
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
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  
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y
w a a
    

   
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   
.             (B.5) 
And this gives, 
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 
 .                                                      (B.6) 
Hence, by (B.4), (B.5) and (B.6), we can define, 
      11 11 1 1, exp ii iif s y s C y  . 
And then we are in the position to prove that, 
       11 11 11 1 1, exp ,ii ii if s y s C y f s y   . 
in which  
1
1,if s y
  is a supermeanvalued majorant of   
1
1,if s y . Firstly, noting that, 
   1 11 1, expi iif s y s     
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which holds by (B.2). Secondly, to prove, 
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              , 
                                                  for 
1
1 10 iy y
   . 
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Define 
 1 1i y    11 11 1ii iC y w    
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            . 
Then with our chosen values of  1iC  and 1i , we see that    1 11 11 1 0i ii iy y    . Furthermore, 
noting that       11 1 1 1 21 11 ii i i iy C y       , and hence  1 1 0i y    holds for 11 10 iy y     
given 1 1i   in (B.4), that is,  1 1 0i y   follows for  0  1y
1
1
iy
 . And this completes the 
short proof. 
 
Case 1.2: 
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              
   

 
It is easy to see that the proof  is quite similar to that of  case 1.1, so we take it omitted. 
 
STEP 2: For strategy 2i ,  2 21, 2,...,i I . Notice that, 
   2 22 1, expi iif s x s       
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Case 2.1: 
   
   
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   

 
Hence, 
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2
1, 0if s x   
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  . 
Then, we have, 
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   
  .  (B.7) 
So it is natural to guess that the continuation region 2iD  has the following form, 
    2 2 21 1 1 1, ;0i i iD x s x x x    . 
where, 
   
   
12 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 21
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x
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     
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   
        
   
  .              (B.8) 
Notice that the generator of  ( )Z t  is given by, 
       2 2 2
2
2
21 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 2
1,
2 ( )
Ti i iT
i s x x e Ay xs x x
          
    
           1 212 1 1 2 1 1 1 1
0
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1
, , ,i
n
i l l i l l l lx
l
s x x z s x x z s x dz       


   
for  
2
1,i s x   2 2C  . If  we choose      222 1 1, exp iii s x s x       for some constant 
2i   . Then we get,  
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         2 22 2 22 11 1 1 11, exp i ii i iTi s x s x e Ay x x        
      
       22 22 21 1 1 11 12
iT i ix x
         
         21 2 221 1 1 1 1 1
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i
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x x z x z x x dz
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
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    22 221exp ii iis x h      . 
where, 
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0
1
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1 1
1
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Noting that, 
2
2 1
(1) iTih e Ay     and  222limi iih      . 
Consequently, if  we suppose that, 
2
1
iTe Ay   ,                                                             (B.9) 
Thus, it is easily seen that there exists 2 1i   such that, 
 22 0iih    .                                                           (B.10) 
with this value of  2i  we put, 
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in which 2 0iC   is some constant that remains to be determined. If  we require that 
2i
  is 
continuous at 
2
1 1
ix x
  we get the following equation, 
     122 2 22 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
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    ,   (B.11) 
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If  we require that 
2i
  is differentiable at 
2
1 1
ix x
  we get the additional equation, 
   22 2 22 2 211 1 2ii i ii i iC x w b b      .                                            (B.12) 
So, combining equation (B.11) and equation (B.12) yields, 
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  
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And this produces, 
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.                                                     (B.14) 
Then, by applying equation (B.10), equation (B.13) and equation (B.14), we are in the position to 
prove that       22 22 1 1, exp ii iif s x s C x        is a supermeanvalued majorant of   2 1,if s x . Firstly, 
noting that, 
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   
   
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which holds by (B.8). Secondly, to show that, 
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                                                  for 
2
1 10 ix x
   . 
Define 
 2 1i x    22 21 1ii iC x w      
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          . 
Then with our chosen values of  2iC  and 2i , we see that    2 22 21 1 0i ii ix x     . Furthermore, 
noting that      22 2 2 2 21 11 ii i i ix C x           , and hence  2 1 0i x    holds for 21 10 ix x     
given 2 1i   in (B.10), that is,  2 1 0i x   follows for 
2
1 10 ix x
   . And hence the desired 
result is established. 
 
Case 2.2: 
   
   
1
2 2 2 2
2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
1
2
2 2
2 2 1
3
1 1 2
1 0
sgn sgn
I
i i i i T T
i I i i I i I i i
i
iT
i i
w w b b e B
e Ay b b
     

   

              
   

 
Similar to case 1.2 and we take the proof  of  case 2.2, which is quite similar to that of  case 2.1, 
omitted. 
 
STEP 3: The existence of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching. 
It follows from the requirements of  Problem 1 that 1 11 2 ...y y
   
1
1 ...iy
 
1
1
Iy
  with 
1
1
iy
  
defined in (B.5). Let 
1 1
1 1
i ky y
   ( 1 1i k  , 1 1 1, 1, 2,...,i k I ), then one can easily see that, 
1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1,23 2 ,34 3 , 1, 1
...i k I i k I i k I I i k             . 
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where, 
 
  
 
  
1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 1 1
, 1 , 1
, , 1
1 2 1 21 1
i k
i j i j k j k j
i k j j i k
i i k k
a a a a
a a a a
 
 
 

      . 
   
  
   
  
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 11 2 1 2
1 1
1 1
k k k i i iT T
k I k i I i
i k k k i i
k k i i
w w a e A w w a e A
a a w a a w
   
 
               
 
 . 
1 1i k  , 1 1 1, 1,2,...,i k I ; 2 22,3,..., 1j I  . 
Accordingly, we have, 
2 2
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2
12,23 12,34 12, 1,
23,23 23,34 23, 1,
1, ,23 1, ,34 1, , 1, ( 1) ( 2)
I I
I I
I I I I I I I I I I


      
             


   

 
2
2
2
2
3
1 ( 2) 1
I
I
I





 
       




 
1 1
1
12
23
1, ( 1) 1I I I  
       
 . 
which implies that, 
    .                                                              (B.15) 
where “ ” denotes Moore-Penrose generalized inverse. 
Similarly, we obtain 1 11 2 ...x x
   
2
1 ...ix
 
2
1
Ix
  with 
2
1
ix
  defined in (B.13) according to 
Problem 1. Now, let 
2 2
1 1
i kx x
   ( 2 2i k  , 2 2 2, 1, 2,...,i k I ), then we get, 
2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2,23 2 ,34 3 , 1, 1
...i k I i k I i k I I i k               . 
where, 
 
  
 
  
2 2
2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
2 2 1 1 2 2
2 2 2 2
, 1 , 1
, , 1
1 2 1 21 1
i k
i j i j k j k j
i k j j i k
i i k k
b b b b
b b b b
 
 
 

     
 
    . 
   
  
   
  
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 1 2 2 1 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 21 2 1 2
1 1
1 1
k k k i i iT T T T
k I k i I i
i k k k i i
k k i i
w w b e B w w b e B
b b w b b w
   
 
               
           . 
2 2i k  , 2 2 2, 1, 2,...,i k I ; 1 12,3,..., 1j I  . 
Consequently, we obtain, 
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1 1
1 1
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1
12,23 12,34 12, 1,
23,23 23,34 23, 1,
1, ,23 1, ,34 1, , 1, ( 1) ( 2)
I I
I I
I I I I I I I I I I


      
             
  
  
   
  
 
1
1
1
2
3
1 ( 2) 1
I
I
I





 
       

 
2 2 2
12
23
1, ( 1) 1I I I  
       




. 
which leads us to the following equation, 
     .                                                              (B.16) 
where “ ” stands for the Moore-Penrose generalized inverse. 
Consequently, by equations in (B.16) and (B.15), we get 
2
2 1
2Iy y   , 23 3Iy      
2 2I
  , … , 2Iy   1 1   and 12 12Ix x   , 1 13 3 2I Ix      ,…, 1Ix   1 1  with 1 1 11 2y y y     

1 1
1 1... ...i Iy y
     and 1 1 11 2x x x    2 21 1... ...i Ix x     . So, we obtain the corresponding game 
equilibrium, denoted by 
  1 11( , ) ( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , ) ,Ti Ix y x y x y x y           
  2 21( , ) ( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , ) Ti Iy x y x y x y x              
with 1 1
1
( , ) 1I i
i
x y     and 2 2
2
( , ) 1I i
i
y x     , but noting that this game equilibrium may be not 
the Pareto optimal equilibrium of  the original normal form games thanks to the stochastic factors, 
and this is why we need to choose appropriate values of    and   such that the original Pareto 
optimal Nash equilibrium  ˆ ˆ,x y  will be absolutely chosen by the players. 
To summarize, we get the following theorem, 
THEOREM 1’: If  we are provided that the following inequalities hold, that is, 11
iT Te B x   in (B.3) and 
2
1
iTe Ay    in (B.9), then Problem 1 is solved as long as we have      in (B.15) and       in 
(B.16). That is to say, the existence of  the Pareto optimal endogenous matching is confirmed just via putting 
ˆ( , )x y x    and ˆ( , )y x y   , in which  ˆ ˆ,x y  is the given Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in the 
corresponding normal form games. 
Therefore, Theorem 1 is established thanks to Theorem 1’. ▌ 
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C. Proof  of  Theorem 2 
The technique used here is mainly developed by Dai (2012). 
By the Doob’s Martingale Inequality, 
1 1
1 1 1
1 1 10
1 (0)sup ( ) ( )
i i
i i i
i i i
t T
X xX t X T
 
               , 
1 0i  , 0T  .        (C.1) 
Without loss of  any generality, we put 1 12i k   for 1k  , then we get, 
1 1 1
10
1sup ( ) 2
2
i k i
k
t T
X t x
 
     , 1k  , 0T  . 
By using the well-known Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we arrive at, 
1 1
1
0
sup ( ) 2 . . 0i k
t T
X t i m k
 
     . 
where 1. .i m k  stands for “infinitely many 1k ”. So for a.a.  , there exists 1ˆ( )k   such that, 
1 1
0
sup ( ) 2i k
t T
X t
 
 , a.s. for 1 1ˆ( )k k  , 0T  . 
i.e., 
1 1
0
lim sup ( ) 2i k
T t T
X t  
 , a.s. for 1 1ˆ( )k k  .                             
Consequently, 1 1( ) ( , )i iX t X t   is uniformly bounded for  0,t T , 0T   and for a.a. 
 . Hence, it is ensured that 1 1( ) ( , )i iX t X t   converges a.s. and the corresponding limit 
belongs to 1( )L   thanks to the Doob’s Martingale Convergence Theorem. Moreover, by applying 
the Kolmogorov’s Inequality, we arrive at, 
1 1 1
1 20
1sup ( ) var ( )
( )
i i i
i
t T
X t X T
 
           , 
10 i     , 0T  . 
It follows from (C.1) that, 
1
1
1 12
1 var ( )
( )
i
i
i i
xX T        
1 1 1var ( )i i iX T x     , 0T  .                 (C.2) 
Noting that, 
1 1 1
2 2var ( ) ( ) ( )i i iX T X T x          , 0T  . 
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We get by (C.2), 
 1 1 1 12( )i i i iX T x x         , 10 i     , 0T  . 
which yields, 
 1 1 1 12
0
sup ( )i i i i
T
X T x x

         . 
Accordingly, 1 1( ) ( , )i iX t X t   converges in 1( )L   by using the Doob’s Martingale Convergence 
Theorem again. 
Furthermore, it is easily seen that 1 1( ) ( , )i iX t x y   , in which 1 ( , )ix y    is given by 
Corollary 1, is also an t  martingale w. r. t.  . Thus, applying the Doob’s Martingale Inequality 
again implies that, 
1
1 1 1 1
1
1
0 1
sup ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
i
i i i i
i
t T
IX t x y X T x y
I
 
  
 
           
  , 1i   , 0T  . (C.3) 
Provided that  2 1 1( ) inf 0; ( ) ( , )i i it X t x y        (  1 11, 2,...,i I  and  2 1, 2,i  2..., I ) 
determined by Corollary 1, we see that there exists 1 0i   such that the martingale inequality in 
(C.3) holds for    1 2 2 11 ( ) 0; ( )ii i i iB               for 1 11, 2,...,i I  and  2 1, 2,i   
2..., I  by using Doob’s Optional Sampling Theorem. Thus, 1 1( ) ( , )
i iX x y    is uniformly 
bounded on the compact set  1 21 ( )ii iB    by applying the Heine-Borel Theorem, Weierstrass 
Theorem and Triangle Inequality. Therefore, we, without loss of  generality, set up 01 2 ki   for 
0k   and employ the continuity of  martingale w. r. t. time t  for any given   so that for 
 1 1 210 ( )ii i ikT B     , based upon the well-known Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem, we 
are led to, 
1
1 1 1 1 1
0110 00
1
0 1
limsup sup ( ) ( , ) limsup ( ) ( , ) 0
i
k
i
i i i i i
ki
k kt T
IX t x y X T x y
I
 
  
  
             
  . 
almost surely. And this implies that, 
  57
1
1 1
10 0
0 1
limsup sup ( ) ( , ) 1
i
k
i
i i
k t T
X t x y
I
 
  
      
 , a.s. 
Letting 1 12
i k I  , k  , we get, 
1 1
10 0
0
limsup sup ( ) ( , ) 2 1
i
k
i i k
k t T
X t x y   
  
      
 , a.s., k   
It follows from the well-known Fatou’s Lemma that, 
1 1
20 ( )
sup ( ) ( , ) 2 1
i
i i k
t
X t x y
 


  
 
      , a.s.,  k   
Then, applying the Borel-Cantelli Lemma again implies that, 
1 1
20 ( )
sup ( ) ( , ) 2 . . 1
i
i i k
t
X t x y i m k
 


  
 
       
in which . .i m k  stands for “infinitely many k ”. So for a.a.  , there exists ( )k    such 
that, 
1 1
20 ( )
sup ( ) ( , ) 2
i
i i k
t
X t x y
 


  
 
 

 for ( )k k   . 
That is, 
1
1 1
20 ( ) 1
sup ( ) ( , )
i
i
i i
t
X t x y
I 


 
 
 

,  a.s. 
for 1 11, 2,...,i I  and  2 1, 2,i  2..., I . Now, we define the supremum norm x   1
1
max i
i
x  
equipped with uniform topology. Thus, one may easily obtain, 
2 20 ( )
sup ( ) ( , )
it
X t x y
 


 
 


 
2
1
0 ( )
sup ( ) ( , )
it
I X t x y
 


 
 
 

 
 
1 1
2 1 1
1 1,2,...,0 ( )
sup max ( ) ( , )
i
i i
i It
I X t x y
 


 
 
 

 
1 1
2
ˆ ˆ
1
0 ( )
sup ( ) ( , )
i
i i
t
I X t x y
 


 
 
 

 
1
1
ˆ
ˆ
1
1
i
iI
I
   ,  a.s. 
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Notice the arbitrariness of  1ˆi , we get,  
2 2 2( ) 0 ( )
lim sup ( ) ( , ) 0
i it
X t x y
   
         ,  a.s. 
That is to say, 
2
1 0
1( ) ( , ) 0
k t t t
X t x y
k
    
   
          . 
Equivalently, for k  , we arrive at, 
2
0
1( ) ( , ) 0
t t t
X t x y
k
   
  
          . 
i.e., for 0  , 
2
lim ( ) ( , ) 0
t
t t
X t x y     
         . 
which gives the desired assertion in (i). Notice that the proof  of  (ii) will be quite similar to that of  (i), 
we will take it omitted. And hence we have completed the whole proof. ▌ 
 
D. Proof  of  Proposition 2 
Provided the SDEs defined in (4) and (6), and it follows from Assumption 9 that for  2 p   , 
0T  , we have, 
1 1
2 20 0
ˆsup ( ) sup ( ) 1
pp
t T t T
X t X t
   
            ,                                      (D.1) 
where, 
     1 1
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0
( ) (0) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,I n
t t t
X t X X s F Y s ds X s G s dW s X s H s z N ds dz           
     1 1
0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) (0) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,I n
t t t
X t X X s F Y s ds X s G s dW s X s H s z N ds dz           
Here, and throughout the current proof, we suppose that ˆ(0) (0)X X . Moreover, suppose that 
2 2
ˆ( ) ( )X t X t E   for t    and E   . Indeed, one just need to let E 1 . In what 
follows, we first define the following stopping times, 
 2inf 0; ( )E t X t E   ,  2ˆˆ inf 0; ( )E t X t E   , 0 ˆE E E   . 
By the Young Inequality (see, Higham et al., 2003) and for any 0S  , 
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   
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               
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 2
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2
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p
p
E ET or T
S
 

   ,                                             (D.2) 
It follows from (D.1) that, 
     1 1 12 2
0
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pE
E T p p p
t T
X
T X t
E E E
    
            
   . 
Similarly,  1 ˆ 1 pE T E   . So, 
     1 1 1 2ˆ ˆ,E E E E pT or T T T E            . 
Moreover, we obtain by (D.1), 
 1 1 1 22 20 0ˆ ˆsup ( ) ( ) 2 sup ( ) ( ) 2p ppp pt T t TX t X t X t X t                 . 
Hence, (D.2) becomes, 
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
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         .      (D.3) 
By the Cauchy-Bunyakovsky-Schwarz Inequality, we get, 
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X s H s z X s H s z N ds dz
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Taking expectations on both sides, and using Itô’s Isometry and the stochastic Fubini Theorem, we 
have for any T  , 
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where we have used Assumption 7 and 8. Hence, applying Gronwall’s Inequality (see, Higham et al., 
2003) implies that, 
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Inserting this into (D.3) leads us to, 
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Hence, for 0  , we can shoose S  and E  such that, 
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And for any given 0T  , we put 1  such that, 
  21 1 1 1ˆ ˆ4 ( 1) exp 4 ( 1) 3T T K T K K            . 
Thus, for 0  , we obtain, 
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3 3 3t T
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 
        . 
Notice the arbitrariness of   , and employ the well-known Levi Lemma gives the desired result in (i). 
One can easily check that the proof  of  (ii) is quite similar to that of  (i), so we omit it. And this 
completes the whole proof. ▌ 
 
 
